Courtesy of SFMTA.

As one would expect in a market price experiment — as opposed to an exclusive revenue generation measure, or “stealth tax,” as it has been dubbed by the literati that haunt the SFGate comments section — the SFMTA both increased and decreased different meter rates depending on the level of demand for those parking spots.  In fact, for this first round of adjustments, most parking meters in pilot neighborhoods will be no more expensive to use than before.  Rates will decrease at 32 percent of meters within the pilot area, stay the same at 37 percent of meters, and increase at only 31 percent of meters.

Responding to the data (available as both PDF maps and an Excel spreadsheet) creates a fine-grained result in which one block may have higher rates, while a nearby or even directly adjacent block has lower rates.  Not surprisingly, there is a need to boost the price at many times of day on popular and walkable commercial segments (e.g. Hayes Street between Franklin and Laguna, Valencia Street, Fillmore Street between Bush and Jackson, Chestnut Street west of Fillmore, and the Financial District/Jackson Square).  In contrast, prices will stay the same or decrease on weekdays for high-volume traffic arteries like Geary Blvd., Van Ness, and Lombard, as well as significant portions of the Wharf, Civic Center, and South of Market pilot areas.  Although the SFMTA could have decreased rates this month by as much as 50 cents under its adopted policy, the data collected so far suggests that in three cases (Fillmore, Mission, and Marina), the rate should not be lowered more than 25 cents at any meter throughout the time period in which the meters operate, while in other pilot areas a 50-cent decrease is sometimes warranted.

That’s one reason I was excited that SFpark launched this past week, generating a continuous open data feed that tracks the location and quantity of available parking in the handful of identified pilot neighborhoods. Consider the following maps of the Fillmore and Mission, screenshots from Friday night:

SFpark pilot areas: Fillmore (left) and Mission (right), on Friday night (April 22 at 10:15 p.m.). Red = 0-15 percent of parking available, light blue = 15-30 percent available, dark blue = more than 30 percent available.

(Links to all Friday maps: Financial District, South of Market, Civic Center/Hayes Valley, Fillmore, Mission, Wharf, Marina.)

And another set of screenshots for the Financial District and South of Market, taken at 12 noon on Sunday:

SFpark pilot area: Financial District, on Sunday (April 24 at 12 noon). Red = 0-15 percent of parking available, light blue = 15-30 percent available, dark blue = more than 30 percent available.

SFpark pilot area: South of Market, on Sunday (April 24 at 12 noon). Red = 0-15 percent of parking available, light blue = 15-30 percent available, dark blue = more than 30 percent available.

(Links to all Sunday maps: Financial District, South of Market, Civic Center/Hayes Valley, Fillmore, Mission, Wharf, Marina.)

The MTA will monitor occupancy on each block and adjust the parking meter rate periodically based on demand. To ensure that at least one parking spot is available per block for the most part, pilot blocks that are at least 85 percent occupied during certain periods of the day will be targeted for a rate increase during those time periods. In the screenshots above, stretches of block marked in red, with less than 15 percent of spots available, are those high-demand spots that would theoretically be targeted for a rate increase.

One conclusion that can be derived at a glance? That the market price for parking in the evenings and on Sundays in these pilot neighborhoods is higher than what is currently being charged (which is zilch).  When parking is free, motorists have little incentive to vacate parking spots in a timely fashion.  Another good reason to revisit extended parking meter hours?

(No, this is not a groundbreaking revelation.  Yes, there was already data supporting agency staff’s previous recommendation to extend meter hours.  Yes, that data was ignored by squirming politicians.)

SFpark meter in Hayes Valley, San Francisco. Image: courtesy of SFMTA.

Although programs like SFpark demonstrate progress and provide valuable case studies, opportunities abound to improve parking management in both major cities and suburbs throughout the United States.  But parking is also a touchy and controversial topic; proposals to increase parking fees are generally not greeted warmly and can be vociferously protested.

Learning from Mistakes

One barrier to implementing effective parking policy is the context in which government officials propose changes to parking fees.  Particularly during the recession, municipalities have been strapped for cash and seek to increase parking fees as a means of generating revenue to help balance the budget.  The result is that the sound policy reasons to raise the price of parking become drowned out by loud opposition from members of the public, who claim to be victims of an unfair budget that is balanced on the backs of citizens.  Cities that wait until a budget crisis knocks at their door to increase the price of parking are not doing themselves a favor because the underlying motivation for the adjustment will be transparent.  Moreover, the substance of the changes that are proposed may also reveal that underlying motivation, in that they involve simplistic blanket fee hikes — rather than a truly dynamic, market-based approach where the price of a particular parking spot changes with demand.  In short, it becomes all too clear that the purpose of the higher parking fees is not to enact sound policy, but to generate revenue.  When a city tries to do the right thing for the “wrong” reason — to the extent that increasing parking fees to avoid cutting municipal services can be deemed “wrong” — it makes it all the more difficult to try it again later for the right reason.

The marquee of the Grand Lake Theater in Oakland, which proudly displays progressive political messages, adopted a conservative stance on parking in 2009 -- an all-too-common knee-jerk reaction among many merchants. Image: courtesy of Fragmentary Evidence.

Another barrier to implementing effective parking policy is the perception that higher parking fees diminish a city’s competitiveness, as compared to nearby cities, by making it more difficult for merchants to attract customers.  This point emerged during the backlash in 2009, when the Oakland City Council considered higher fees and extended meter hours as one measure to address the city’s budget deficit.  The underlying assumption here is that the cost of parking is a significant, perhaps even the predominant, factor at play when someone is deciding where to eat dinner, see a movie, or go shopping.  And while this concern was perhaps an especially sensitive point in Oakland because of retail leakage, it overlooks several more important considerations, including: (1) that most people probably won’t travel long distances just to find cheaper parking, particularly when paying more for gas eliminates any potential savings; (2) that the increase in parking price is often minimal compared to the cost of a meal or movie; (3) that many customers seek a unique merchant, neighborhood, or experience that cannot be replicated elsewhere; and (4) that increasing the cost of parking does not necessarily make the city or neighborhood a less compelling destination, but rather, provides an incentive for customers to use transit to travel to neighborhoods they would otherwise access by car.

There are many reasons to question the assertion that higher parking fees make a city less competitive.  But whether or not this is true in fact, the mere existence of this perception suggests that rational parking reform will be an uphill battle — one in which common arguments opposing higher fees will be aired again and again, in city after city.  It is this situation that helps frame the role that regional governments can play in the conversation about parking.

A Role for Regional Participation

Involving regional entities in parking management may, at first glance, seem like a strange idea.  Traditionally, parking management has been left to cities.  Cities control how streets are used within their respective jurisdictions, and they retain the power to charge (or not) for public parking.  In California, regional entities like metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) cannot simply swoop in and force a city to change its parking policies.

And yet the above discussion suggests that a regional directive on parking could be beneficial.  An MPO can provide valuable direction by identifying best practices, assembling useful case studies, and establishing a policy framework that explains and justifies the benefits of parking demand management.  This readily available resource would provide cities with a more constructive way to frame the public discussion about parking, while educating citizens that parking reform has benefits beyond providing the city with more revenue.  Establishing a regional consensus on parking demand management could also help eliminate the popular perception that increasing the price of parking makes a city a less desirable place to do business when compared to nearby cities that retain low parking fees.  Geographically proximate cities, perhaps with the assistance of the MPO, could cooperate in developing harmonious parking policies.

MPOs can provide grants to cities that demonstrate interest in implementing smart parking demand management strategies, and in this respect, there is a useful precedent.  The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in the Bay Area has been able to take advantage of its control over funding to leverage improvements in land use — particularly in terms of planning transit-oriented development within walking distance of stations planned along new transit extensions.  Land use, like parking, is firmly within the dominion of local control.  And yet regional influence over land use is possible, despite the fact that MPOs like MTC have no statutory authority to make land use approval decisions.

A similar approach could be taken for parking reform, in which a regional policy directive both guides local planning efforts and provides the funding incentive needed to get the job done.  MTC has taken tentative initial steps to investigate what role regional governments should play in the parking arena, and in the future, I hope to discuss in more detail ways to improve regional oversight of parking.

Senate Bill 375 provides metropolitan regions in California with a compelling reason to do so now.  Parking — whether it is abundant or scarce, cheap or expensive — has tremendous influence on shaping travel choices.  Parking demand management could be an effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, both by (1) encouraging drivers to switch to transit, particularly for peak hour trips, and (2) reducing the emissions associated with drivers circling city blocks on the hunt for parking.  Rational parking policies, when combined with smart land use decisions, are a powerful tool for reducing vehicle miles traveled, and, in turn, for achieving SB 375′s regional emissions reductions targets.  One of the core lessons we take away from the Initial Vision Scenario prepared by MTC and ABAG for the Bay Area is that compact growth alone is not sufficient.  The Sustainable Communities Strategy will need to incorporate additional techniques in order to achieve the target.  A strong regional consensus on parking policy, coupled with robust implementation at the local level, could be just such a technique.

Cable car at California and Drumm.

On September 16, the SFMTA and Department of Public Works will begin infrastructure improvements on the California Street cable car line, the first such upgrade carried out since the major 1982-1984 rehabilitation of the cable car system.  In the first phase of the project over the next few months, sewers will be repaired and replaced, and ADA curb ramps will be installed at most intersections along the cable car’s 17-block route between Drumm and Van Ness.  Then, beginning in January 2011 and extending into the summer, switches, track, and electrical components of the cable car line will be replaced.  Alarm sensors and communication cables will be installed, and the street will be resurfaced.  Completing this second phase of the project will require shutting down cable car service and using bus substitution.  The project budget includes $19 million for the cable car work, $3.5 million for street resurfacing and improvements, and $1 million for sewer work.

Top: 3rd St. and Mission St., site of the new bus stop, courtesy of Google. Bottom: map courtesy of SFMTA, via SF Appeal.

Yesterday, the Appeal published a weekend Muni update mentioning a permanent bus stop relocation that will go into effect starting this weekend.  The update is ostensibly sourced from the SFMTA, although the agency’s official transit updates page lacks any mention of this particular item.  The bus stop at issue — served by the 8X, 30, and 45 routes bound for Chinatown — is the 3rd/Market stop, located on 3rd just south of Market, between Stevenson and Jessie.  Although the bus stop is heavily used — it’s about as busy as an average BART station — stop relocation and associated traffic changes were slipped into the consent calendar of an MTA meeting about one year ago, where it was given only cursory consideration by the MTA Board.

The MTA plans to make the following changes.  The bus stop will be moved south of its current location, to the north corner of 3rd and Mission streets; and the lanes of 3rd between Market and Mission will be restriped.  A new right-turn lane will be established on 3rd just south of Market, marking where motorists should turn eastbound onto Market.  The transit-only zone north of the relocated bus stop will be eliminated — so buses departing from the new 3rd/Mission stop would have to merge into the next lane over.  That lane will be widened, giving buses more room to maneuver when 3rd Street angles northward toward Kearny.

The rationale for this new layout is to minimize collisions between cars and buses on 3rd, just south of the intersection with Market Street.  The redesign also benefits motorists to the extent it improves the flow of traffic on 3rd, but there are impacts to transit riders.  There is of course the issue of removing a necessary, albeit unenforced, transit-only lane on this heavily trafficked thoroughfare.  But there is also the issue of shifting the bus stop south, which takes what is currently a very useful bus stop and makes it less useful.

Third/Market is a major transfer point, as many riders either disembark at this stop to transfer to one of the many Market Street lines, or they board here to transfer to a Chinatown line.  MTA data indicates the relative popularity of 3rd/Market and adjacent stops:

The new 3rd/Mission stop would likely be busier than 3rd/Howard, and some riders will surely find the new 3rd/Mission stop to be more convenient.  All the same, the relocated stop lacks the same wealth of immediate transfer opportunities that are available at Market Street, and it seems strange on its face to move a stop that riders clearly find tremendously convenient, based on the data.

The Kearny/Geary stop is also very convenient to those transfer opportunities, and it basically functions as a second Market Street stop.  Riders boarding the Chinatown buses have naturally distributed themselves between the 3rd/Market and Kearny/Geary bus stops — and even with that redundancy, both stops can become quite crowded.  However, once the 3rd/Market stop is relocated, Kearny/Geary will be the only stop on the Chinatown line immediately convenient to Market Street.  The data shows that about 10,000 riders board or disembark at these stops each day.  That’s serious passenger volume for just one bus stop — and while it’s true that not every single 3rd/Market rider will elect to switch to the Kearny/Geary stop, many or most likely will.  Removing the two-stop redundancy could lead to further overcrowding and extended dwell at the Kearny/Geary stop, particularly at peak travel times.

If the issue really is primarily about safety and minimizing collisions between cars and buses at the intersection, then isn’t the better solution here not to create a wider mixed-flow lane, but to (1) maintain and actually enforce the transit-only lane, for a change, and (2) restrict right turns?  Perhaps the primary objective of the SFCTA’s Better Market Street plan is to remove at least some cars from inner Market, thereby improving the performance of surface transit.  Just how is that objective furthered by adding a dedicated right-turn lane on 3rd?  In fact, is it not an express goal of the Better Market Street plan to make this very route — 3rd Street to Kearny — a straight cross-through street, by prohibiting right turns from 3rd onto Market?  So why should we now invite motorists to make that very turn?

SFMTA, allow me to introduce you to the SFCTA.  You may want to get acquainted — or at least each acknowledge that the other exists.

AB X8 6 and AB X8 9 form the pair of budget bills (explained in more detail in this earlier post) executing a gas tax swap.  The Governor initially proposed a completely inadequate gas tax swap measure, which the Legislature then modified with these two bills.  The Legislature’s version allocates a one-time sum of $400 million of operating funds for transit agencies, and then generates about $350 million annually for agencies statewide, starting in FY12.

The initial allocation will provide critically-needed funding for the Bay Area’s transit agencies in these tough times — including $36 million for Muni, $26 million for BART, $15 million for VTA, and $13 million for AC Transit — to be put to use through the upcoming fiscal year.

As we have discussed before, that sum does not come close to restoring funding that the State has repeatedly appropriated in the past to balance its budget, and the bills do not accomplish all that they could.  Therefore, this legislation neither can nor should end the important conversation about how the State ought to fund transit operations in the future.  Still absent from the discussion are stable revenue streams that prioritize transit service in a way that is consistent with the State’s goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and encouraging smart growth. Nonetheless, this allocation is a small step in the right direction, in that it will provide transit agencies with some assistance to weather the budget deficits that loom in the upcoming fiscal year.

I would strongly encourage transit agencies to use this money in a way that preserves service for riders to the maximum extent feasible.  Transit-dependent riders have already experienced significant hardship during this economic downturn, having been obliged to pay higher fares for inferior service.  I particularly direct this comment to my home transit agency, the San Francisco MTA.  The MTA Board is once again discussing a possible declaration of fiscal emergency, which would allow the agency to cut service without preparing the environmental documentation that would otherwise be required under CEQA.  When given such a flexible tool, the MTA Board has historically demonstrated a willingness to put it to use, by cutting service and raising fares.

However, worth noting is that the initial $36 million allocation from the State, when combined with some of the FY11-12 revenue measures that the MTA Board has begun to evaluate, would be enough to obviate the need to declare fiscal emergency.  Obvious measures (PDF) to examine at this point include extended Sunday meters ($2.8 million), a general parking meter extension ($6.3 million in FY11), elimination of free reserved on-street spaces ($2.8 million), adding one thousand new metered spaces ($0.8 million for a half-year), enforcing existing laws regarding parking garage charges in the C-3 zone ($3 million for a half-year), a possible extension of that policy to garages citywide ($2.6 million for a half-year), and a reduction in work orders ($6.5 million).  Consolidation of transit stops, which would save about $3 million per year, is another measure that will be considered by the MTA Board.

There are good policy reasons to implement this suite of measures, quite apart from raising revenue.  But these measures are also necessary to close the gap between the State’s initial allocation and the MTA’s total FY11 budget deficit.  They should be evaluated thoroughly before riders are made to suffer any further cuts to service or increase in fares.

It is nice to see the Governor finally agree to give some money back to transit, and the Legislature should also be recognized for its work in pushing through a partial fix for transit agencies, in spite of the Governor’s reluctance to support a revenue-neutral piece of budget legislation.  Imperfect though it may be, this legislation and the funding it promises will be a welcome booster shot for California’s cash-strapped transit agencies.

The State Legislature, as part of the ongoing state budget effort, has passed a pair of bills, AB X8 6 and AB X8 9, which would establish a tax swap and restore State Transit Assistance (STA) funding, a critical source of money that transit agencies throughout California had previously relied on to fund operations until it was suspended by the State.  While there is no doubt that transit agencies across the nation are struggling, California’s transit agencies have been hit particularly hard, thanks to the elimination of the STA funds.  But relief may be on the way, if Governor Schwarzenegger cooperates.  This is a prime opportunity for the “Green Governor” to show his quality.

AB X8 6 makes various adjustments to the taxes that are assessed on motor vehicle fuel and diesel fuel.  Currently, gasoline is subject to both sales tax and per-gallon excise tax.  Article XIX of the California Constitution generally requires that the proceeds from the excise tax be applied to fund road maintenance, as well as the “research, planning, construction, and improvement” of transit guideways, streets, and highways.  The revenue may also be used to maintain physical transit guideways, but it may not be used for other transit operation and maintenance costs.  This constitutional provision was of interest to the Governor, because it would allow him to take a revenue stream technically dedicated to transit and replace it with an increased excise tax, the proceeds from which could instead be used to patch up the General Fund.

As set forth in the Revenue and Taxation Code, an excise tax of 18 cents is currently assessed per gallon of motor vehicle fuel (§ 7360) and diesel fuel (§ 60050).  Starting July 1, 2010, AB X8 6 would exempt motor vehicle fuel from the sales tax.  Also on July 1, 2010, the excise tax per gallon of motor vehicle fuel would be increased by 17.3 cents, and retailers would pay a 17.3-cent storage tax per gallon of motor vehicle fuel stored.  For diesel fuel, the per-gallon excise tax would decrease to 13.6 cents starting July 1, 2010; a 1.75% tax would also be imposed starting July 1, 2011.  Finally, the State Board of Equalization would be responsible for ensuring each year that these amendments remain revenue-neutral.  That is, the revenue gained by the motor vehicle excise tax increase should not exceed the revenue lost by eliminating the sales tax.  BOE would also be assigned an analogous task for diesel fuel.

The revenue generated from these adjustments would then be used in the gas tax swap mechanism.  I can explain this in more detail if someone is really fascinated, but to skip straight to the juicy part, AB X8 9 provides for an infusion of STA funding for transit operations.  Initially, the bill appropriates $400 million of STA funding statewide that would last through FY11.  An estimated $350 million would then be distributed by formula each year thereafter.

San Francisco MTA’s recent budget-balancing exercise helps demonstrate how this influx of funding will have a tangible effect.  The MTA Board recently approved a 10% system-wide service cut, expecting to save $4.8 million this fiscal year (accounting for the months of May and June).  Cutting 313,000 service hours each year was projected to save $28.5 million annually.  But MTA estimates it would initially receive $36 million of STA funding if these bills are passed — $7.2 million for the remainder of this fiscal year, $28.8 million in FY11, and $31.4 million in FY12.

In other words, San Francisco’s share of the proposed funding more than covers the money that the MTA expected to save by implementing the 10% service cut.  Although the $179 million of STA funds that the MTA has lost over the past three years would not be fully restored in the next three years, this legislation, if signed into law, will nonetheless make a valuable contribution.

But the Governor — naturally, being the Governor — is reluctant about signing these bills.  To justify his reluctance, he offered the nearly brain-dead explanation that the Legislature has “failed to address job creation,” overlooking that new STA funding will allow agencies to preserve service and thereby avoid laying off operators.  His lackluster response, while disappointing, is not surprising.  After all, this legislation aims to mitigate the damage that he is personally responsible for propagating — most recently when he flagrantly ignored state court decisions that invalidated transit funding raids.

But you, the transit-savvy reader, can still help the Governor see the light.  At least we can try.

Here’s where you come in: Please call the Governor’s office as soon as you can.  Urge him to sign these bills into law, so that agencies throughout the Bay Area and California can be provided with much-needed relief, and vital transit service can be preserved:

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
State Capitol Building
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-445-2841
Fax: 916-558-3160

Alternatively, you can email the Governor by clicking this link. Thanks in advance for your participation.

Muni's departed 53 Southern Heights line. Photo taken on the 53's last evening of service.

“Killing Muni Softly” is the sort of post title one would rather use at most once, preferably not at all — but certainly not as the headnote of an occasional series.  No such luck in San Francisco, where transit is caught in a death cycle that may be on course to spiral out of control.  And while the causes of that death cycle undeniably extend well beyond the City and County limit, local government continues to squirm uncomfortably, rather than do the heavy lifting that is necessary to reverse the death cycle and set San Francisco’s ailing Muni system on the road to recovery.

It is encouraging to see that the MTA Board appears to be more serious about increasing parking enforcement to help close the FY11-12 budget gap.  It is likewise encouraging that discussion about revenue-generating ballot measures has commenced.  But in spite of those preliminary positive developments, the MTA simultaneously seeks a way out — by announcing its intention to declare a fiscal emergency.  In light of the FY11-12 budget deficit, MTA projects negative working capital within the next year, which may trigger a finding of fiscal emergency.  By declaring fiscal emergency for this upcoming year, as it has done in some previous years, the MTA seeks a Section 21080.32 exemption from the California Environmental Quality Act.  This exemption allows the MTA to cut Muni service and increase fares without carrying out otherwise-required environmental review under CEQA.

The MTA Board has confirmed its plan to move forward with the 10% service cut that was already approved in conjunction with the FY10 budget.  And yet, there remain unexplored options that could mitigate this painful 10% service cut and the need to declare fiscal emergency—all while ensuring that the MTA Board pursues a more sustainable path in the future.  Assumed in the FY10 year-end budget is that the Transportation Authority will approve a $7 million Proposition K allocation—in spite of the fact that certain Supervisors have indicated their distrust of MTA’s fiscal management.  Instead, MTA could investigate a larger request upfront, so that the amount in excess of $7 million could be used to offset some or all of the $4.8 million saved in this fiscal year from the service cuts.  But instead of having that money simply get sucked into a budgetary black hole, the allocation could be characterized as a loan, conditioned on eventual repayment with funds obtained through new revenue streams.  Meanwhile, SPUR’s budget proposal could be incorporated into the more robust budget fix needed for next fiscal year, covering deficits and obviating the need to declare fiscal emergency.  This strategy would, in turn, give the MTA Board an opportunity to pursue additional revenue streams, both to repay the loan and simply to operate the system in the coming years.  Exploring options of this nature would demonstrate, both to riders and to the Board of Supervisors, that the MTA Board is committed to balancing agency books in a way that looks out for Muni riders, rather than disenfranchising them.

The State has continually retreated from its transit funding obligations, raiding transit to close state budget deficits — this is hardly news.  One might have guessed even a couple years ago that State Transit Assistance funds would eventually be wholly eliminated.  At the very least, the trend indicated that the State would repeatedly dip into transit funding.  But where the federal government does not fund operations, and where the State has ceased to do so, it necessarily falls to local government to make up this difference.  During the period in which the State was withdrawing operations funds, the MTA did not diligently develop new revenue sources.  It did not plan for tough times.

In other words, the upcoming fiscal emergency is neither surprising nor unexpected.  It is certainly not the MTA’s fault that the State raided funds that rightfully belonged to transit agencies.  But the City Charter affirmatively obligates the MTA to do exactly that which the MTA has failed to do — mitigate an unfortunate situation by diligently pursuing funds needed to preserve service:

Charter, Section 8A.109(b): The Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, and the [Municipal Transportation] Agency diligently shall seek to develop new sources of funding for the Agency’s operations, including sources of funding dedicated to the support of such operations, which can be used to supplement or replace that portion of the Municipal Transportation Fund consisting of appropriations from the General Fund of the City and County. . . .

What we have seen, since the approval of the 10% service cut, is a perversion of the transit-first policy laid out in the Charter.  The current climate is one that places significant hurdles blocking the addition of transit service, while freely permitting the deletion of service.  The Transit Effectiveness Project, which aimed to strategically reallocate service and increase investment in core transit corridors, has stalled — but the TEP has provided a treasure trove of data informing what routes could be eliminated.  In other words, the portions of the TEP that proposed to boost service have been put on hold until after environmental review is complete.  But the portions of the TEP that proposed to eliminate service have already been partially implemented — without any environmental review, of course, courtesy of the previously declared fiscal emergency.

Much of the ongoing budget discussion at the Board suffers from a critical defect: it merely draws on existing tools, including service cuts and fare hikes.  Then, when those tools obviously and completely foreseeably fail to balance the budget, the Board essentially throws its hands into the air and readies MTA for yet another fiscal emergency.  To accomplish … what, exactly?  To facilitate the unimpeded decimation of yet more critical lifeline service, after having just signed off on a 10% system-wide cut that relegates many routes to sparse, quasi-suburban headways?  Yes, to their credit, both Nat Ford and the Board expressly disapproved of any further cut to service.  But both also allowed the 10% service cut to be implemented in the first place, without aggressively pursuing other options.  Neither Nat Ford nor the Board ultimately regarded this deep service cut as it should have been regarded — a last resort.  And so, in spite of recent discussion about parking and ballot measures, a new declaration of fiscal emergency for this upcoming fiscal year once again places in the hands of the Board a mechanism by which to desert the transit-first policy.  That has, after all, been a principal use of the fiscal emergency declaration.  The path to unsustainability would be left open and clear, should a new budget deficit come to light in the future — or should the Board decide once again to sidestep implementation of politically controversial budget solutions.

Dedicated sources of revenue are clearly needed to maintain a viable transit system into the future.  The Charter mandates that the MTA carry out the financial planning needed to ensure the succcessful operation of the robust transit system that San Francisco both requires and deserves.  But on some level, the intent to move forward with a declaration of fiscal emergency suggests that, in the Board’s view, there is something acceptable or inevitable about the status quo approach.  The challenge posed by upcoming budgets will not be met if there is only a weak commitment to think creatively and do the hard work that needs to be done.

SPUR’s Budget Proposal

At the February 26, 2010 special budget meeting, SPUR released its own budget proposal (PDF), offering 28 suggestions for MTA to increase revenue and realize additional savings.  The recommendations will be familiar to those who have spent time following Muni issues.  They include the reduction or elimination of department work orders, increased enforcement of parking meters, consolidation of bus stops where appropriate, advertising, reducing overtime, hiring part-time operators, and redirecting Muni-related 311 calls to 511 — among other recommendations.  If all the recommendations were to be implemented, SPUR estimated that its proposal would not just completely account for the budget deficit, but would actually result in a $2.1 million surplus in FY10, and a $9+ million surplus in FY11.

More noteworthy are the measures that SPUR did not call upon — those very measures that have occupied most of the MTA Board’s attention: discount pass hikes and service cuts.  Some of SPUR’s recommendations have more merit than others. Some are relatively straightforward to implement, while others, for all intents and purposes, are prohibitively difficult because they require a legislative adjustment at the State level.  But collectively, SPUR’s recommendations emphasize an important point.  Contrary to whatever the MTA Directors might believe, there are indeed stones that remain unturned.  SPUR has not recommended novel, long-term revenue streams.  Mostly, it has recommended that existing programs be made more efficient, and that existing laws be properly enforced.  Even limiting itself to those tools, SPUR’s proposal manages to emerge with a surplus, all while avoiding significant service cuts and other undesirable measures.  It is somewhat disconcerting that MTA did not pursue these measures in its own FY10 budget proposal.  Why should MTA need to rely on outside advocacy organizations to learn how to balance its own budget?

The FY11-12 Budget

With the FY10 budget process wrapped up, the MTA will now move forward to approve a two-year FY11-12 budget next month.  Existing sources of revenue — parking garage, meters, tax receipts, fares, parking citations, among others — fell short of expectations, opening new deficits to balance.  And among other expenditures, MTA also proposed a needed $10 million toward materials and parts.  When all is said and done, a $56.4 million deficit looms in FY11, which translates into a $45 million deficit in FY12.

MTA’s budget presentation (PDF, via Streetsblog) details some measures and their potential effects on the budget.  The proposed budget solutions draw on several SPUR suggestions:

• MTA is finally looking more carefully at parking.  Extending parking meter enforcement across-the-board could generate $6.3 million in the first year of implementation, and $9 million each year thereafter; Sunday parking meter charges, taken in isolation, would generate $2.8 million. Adding one thousand new metered parking spaces in areas of especially high parking demand would generate $0.8 million in a half year, or about $3 million annually in subsequent years.  Elimination of free, reserved, on-street spaces could generate $2.8 million.  Actually enforcing the requirement that garages zoned C-3 charge on an hourly basis would generate $3 million in the first half-year, and about $6 million annually in subsequent years.  Extending this C-3 policy citywide would almost double that revenue.  What we conclude is that if MTA were to implement the most robust parking proposal, about $26 million annually would be added to MTA coffers after the first year of implementation.
• A 10% reduction of work orders could add about $6.5 million.
• Raising fees to recover various costs could generate $1.5 million.
• Noting that about 15% of boardings are transfers, MTA proposed either charging 50 cents for a transfer (generating $7.5 million) or eliminating them altogether (possibly generating $20.4 million in annual revenue).
• Consolidation of transit stops would result in about $3 million.
• Regulatory penalty schedule for taxis would generate $0.1 million.
• Transit vehicle window advertising wrap would generate about $1 million.
• Indexing fare and pass increases could generate $3.5 million.
• Each additional 5% cut to service (reduction of 156,500 service hours annually) that is implemented would save $7.2 million.

The parking measures are not a panacea for the budget deficit; but when they are taken together, they represent a significant source of revenue that must be kept on the table.  There is simply no excuse for ignoring such an obvious and straightforward budget solution.

As for the proposed elimination of free transfers: this idea has been raised in the past and has been consistently rejected. It should be rejected once again.  The orientation of Muni service is a matrix of routes that fundamentally depends on free access to transfers.  Changing the transfer policy should ideally be accompanied by a reorientation of service to include more angular-shaped routes; but no such reorientation has been discussed.  Moreover, any additional cut to service, fast on the heels of the 10% cut, would render the Muni system increasingly unusable and is thus similarly unacceptable.  The MTA Board properly rejected both of these proposals.

The MTA has also begun to evaluate revenue-generating ballot measures, which require various degrees of government approval:

• The vehicle license fee proposal (restoring the additional 0.85% of vehicle purchase price) would generate about $33 million annually, but it would require authorization at the State level, in addition to the Board of Supervisors adding it to the ballot.  In terms of effort exerted per dollar of expected revenue, this measure would not provide the best bang for the buck, and thus would not be the most strategic choice for a ballot measure.
• There are a few smaller measures that the MTA Board has the authority to approve without approval at higher echelons of government.  These include a 1% increase in the hotel occupancy tax (generating $15 million), a 10% increase in the commercial off-street parking tax (generating $20 million), and a parcel tax (generating $20 million).
• The measure that could provide the most bang for the buck is a 0.5% increase in sales tax, which would be put on the ballot by the Board of Supervisors.  In light of the current economy, a sales tax is a hard sell to voters.  However, if passed, the sales tax measure could provide $70-75 million annually and would do the most to stabilize future MTA budgets without the need to pursue approval at the State level.

This post has gotten rather lengthy, so I’ll close it here for now.  Future posts will include further discussion of budget-related issues.

Included in the transit funding are the New and Small Starts grants, which set aside a total of over $1.8 billion for capital investments in transit around the nation. The bulk of the New Starts funding is proposed for major transit projects outside of California.  Three major projects serving New York City (Second Avenue Subway, East Side Access, and ARC) are allocated $612 million.  Other allocations include those for Salt Lake City projects ($180 million), Houston projects ($150 million), Denver projects ($120 million), Seattle University Link ($110 million), Dulles Metrorail ($96 million), Dallas Northwest/Southeast light rail ($86 million), Honolulu Rail Transit project ($55 million), Hartford busway ($45 million), Twin Cities Central Corridor ($45 million), and Orlando’s Central Florida Commuter Rail project ($40 million).  A total of $200 million of Small Starts funding is also included for distribution to several other projects, mostly bus rapid transit.

Although the Bay Area was not in a position this year to receive as much funding as some other parts of the country, the budget nonetheless recommends $50 million for use on three major Bay Area transit projects.  The Central Subway, Van Ness BRT, and East Bay BRT are all considered by FTA to be priorities for funding:

• Central Subway: The $20 million New Starts sum in this budget is a small portion of roughly $950 million in federal funding that the Central Subway is ultimately slated to receive, amounting to 60% of the $1.57 billion project cost.
• Van Ness BRT: The $15 million sum in this budget is a partial allocation of up to $75 million Small Starts for which this BRT corridor would be eligible, assuming that San Francisco opts to construct one of the two serious center lane BRT alternatives (rather than side lane BRT, which would be cheaper to build but would provide only diluted transit benefits).  The maximum $75 million federal contribution would represent 57-63% of the total capital cost of $118-132 million.
• East Bay BRT: The $15 million sum in this budget is a partial allocation of up to $75 million Small Starts for which this BRT corridor would be eligible.  The maximum $75 million federal contribution would represent about one-third of the total capital cost of $235 million.  The exact status of the project is uncertain, in light of a requested swap for operations money. Nonetheless, AC Transit continues to move forward with environmental work and has not abandoned the project.  A match of local funding has also been retained for the time being, so it is good to see that FTA has prioritized this BRT corridor.