Corridors like Telegraph Avenue, which are well-served by transit and have plenty of room for urban infill, will be targeted for growth. Image: Flickr account.

SB 375 now calls for a blend of the RHNA with the Sustainable Communities Strategy (SCS):

It is the intent of the Legislature that housing planning be coordinated and integrated with the regional transportation plan. To achieve this goal, the allocation plan shall allocate housing units within the region consistent with the development pattern included in the sustainable communities strategy.

The final allocation plan shall ensure that the total regional housing need, by income category … is maintained, and that each jurisdiction in the region receive an allocation of units for low- and very low income households.

The resolution approving the final housing need allocation plan shall demonstrate that the plan is consistent with the sustainable communities strategy in the regional transportation plan.

(Government Code, §§ 65584.04(i)(1), 65584.04(i)(2), 65584.04(i)(3).)

SB 375 leaves open the question of exactly how the two ought to be blended.  But if you acknowledge that growth should be targeted in transit-oriented locations rather than simply allowed to sprout at random, then it is almost a direct corollary that an “unfair share” distribution of housing will result.  Perhaps because it is still early in the process, ABAG and MTC thus far have not emphasized the fair share distinction.  It was not surprising, then, to find some initial pushback in a report prepared by Berkeley city staff.  This piece in the Berkeley Patch, written by Livable Berkeley, summarizes the conclusions of the staff report as follows:

City staff’s “educated guess” is that the level of growth posited in the scenario exceeds what can be feasibly accommodated in Berkeley.  Staff is also concerned that other communities are not being asked to do as much as Berkeley.

Staff’s remarks were offered in response to the Initial Vision Scenario, which included a preliminary estimate of the new housing Berkeley should plan to accommodate: 15,730 additional units under ABAG’s aggressive growth projections, concentrated in the downtown and along more robust transit corridors like San Pablo, University, and Telegraph Avenues.  Interestingly, even though staff offers its “educated guess” that this level of growth cannot be feasibly accommodated, the report admits that “staff has not generally quantified the capacity of these areas to accommodate new units” and that “staff has not begun to test the feasibility of the numbers generated for the [Initial Vision Scenario].”  (PDF of staff report)

In short, Berkeley city staff has offered an “educated guess” that is ostensibly based on little education.  Which would make it … just a plain old guess?  The report proposes that the guess is based on the City’s Housing Element work, but that is an iterative process, and it does not terminate just because a city claims it has no more space after completing the last iteration.

The staff report illustrates the tension between SB 375 and fair share.  Hypothetically, if all cities were served by transit equally well, it would be reasonable to expect each city to absorb its fair share of housing need in the traditional sense.  In reality, though, transit service is not provided uniformly throughout the region, and a principal objective of the SCS is to bring transit networks and housing distributions into alignment.  This means that a city like Berkeley — which is home to the University, a major trip generator, and is served by three BART stations, the Capitol Corridor, and major bus transit corridors — is a natural place for growth.  Clayton (to pick one example), which was assigned just 124 new households, is not.

That disparity may seem “unfair” to some, but the Initial Vision Scenario arguably does not go far enough.  If one goal of the SCS is to increase the share of the Bay Area’s population living in places that resemble Berkeley, the Initial Vision Scenario does not accomplish that goal with respect to Berkeley itself — because the growth it describes in Berkeley closely mirrors the regional trend and is actually slower than Alameda County as a whole.  Indeed, in 2010, 1.728 percent of Bay Area households called Berkeley home; in 2035, if the Initial Vision Scenario’s allocation were to become reality, that share would barely increase to 1.732 percent.  In contrast, the allocations for other East Bay cities like Oakland, Emeryville, Fremont, Livermore, Dublin, and Pleasanton pick up the slack with growth that outpaces both Alameda County and the region as a whole.  Notably, the Initial Vision Scenario does not take into account unmet demand for more housing in walkable, centrally-located neighborhoods like those in Berkeley.

To the extent there is a break from fair share as it has traditionally been implemented, the concerns of the Berkeley staff report will resonate with other cities in California, and it will be interesting to see how fair share is ultimately folded into the SB 375 framework.

At what point is a project far enough along in the process to be “committed”?  We looked before at the two policy choices that were being considered.  There is more detail in that previous post, but the brief recap is that with “Option 1,” a project is committed if it has been environmentally cleared, e.g. the project has an EIR certified under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  With “Option 2,” a project is not committed until dirt has turned and construction is underway.  Of these two options, I supported Option 2 because it would expose commissioners to a benefit-cost analysis for more projects, thereby empowering them with greater discretion to decide whether even older projects are still worthy of pursuit.  The Planning Committee also supported Option 2 and voted to move it forward to the full Commission.

At its April 27 meeting, however, the Commission unfortunately retreated from the committee recommendation, voting in favor of the less rigorous Option 1.

Part of what made this vote disappointing was that some committee members who supported Option 2 a few weeks ago changed their minds and voted for Option 1.  These fickle commissioners include the now-ousted Jon Rubin (who frankly surprised me when he supported Option 2 in the first place, but ultimately opted to cast a less-than-stellar vote as his final vote on the Commission) and Sam Liccardo (a San Jose councilmember whom I suspect was concerned about placing too many obstacles in front of the full BART extension).  Had these committee members continued to support Option 2, the vote would have tilted the other way.

Other commissioners, albeit too few in number to change the vote, recognized that projects should be included based on their intrinsic merit and ability to satisfy performance targets.  These commissioners include San Francisco supervisor David Campos (who, despite being newly appointed, honed in on the issue quickly, or at least picked up on the right cues), and BCDC commissioner Anne Halsted (who was willing to engage and grasped the value of Option 2 in the climate target discussion).

Had the new committed projects policy been in place a few years ago, building the Caldecott Tunnel's fourth bore would have been subject to performance review and Commission approval under Option 2 but not Option 1. Image: courtesy of Caltrans.

Over the past few years certain high-profile projects, like Warm Springs and the Caldecott Tunnel fourth bore, have moved forward into construction phase and are deemed committed no matter what.  The practical implications of choosing one option over the other will emerge as the next project cycle takes shape.  As a matter of principle, though, the Commission’s vote demonstrates an unwillingness to take responsibility for ensuring that taxpayer dollars are invested wisely, and a reluctance to engage in true planning, as opposed to mere assembly of a to-do list.

Although this is disheartening, it is not surprising.  Even when sitting on a regional board, commissioners are still elected local officials at heart, interested in moving projects forward with a minimum of delay and controversy.  Whether a particular local project is the best and most cost-effective way to meet identified regional performance targets is a different and sometimes even conflicting question, however, and it is precisely the question that commissioners would have confronted more robustly had Option 2 moved forward.  Although Option 1 is an improvement on previous policy, even Option 1 does not go far enough.  Under Option 1, projects that have been environmentally cleared are insulated, and it is true that environmental clearance is itself a major milestone that is reached only after a project has been subjected to significant public comment.  But environmental laws like CEQA are designed primarily to disclose a project’s impacts to the physical environment.  They are not designed to effectively engage the issues that are central to deciding whether a region should commit funding to a particular transportation project.  Having that latter discussion requires an additional layer of regional oversight, which Option 2 would have provided. Moreover, as the Oakland Airport Connector demonstrates, projects can change significantly in cost and scope if they are left in limbo for years after being cleared.  Yet Option 1 shields those changes from scrutiny.

Option 2 would also have put MTC in a better position to meet the Bay Area’s obligations under Senate Bill 375.  One of the principal takeaways from the Initial Vision Scenario is that meeting the regional target of 15 percent per capita reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is more than simply a matter of concentrating growth in the right places — for despite its optimistic assumptions, even that scenario fell short of achieving the 15 percent target.  MTC will need to bring to bear more tools in order to craft an RTP and Sustainable Communities Strategy that does meet the target, and one critically important tool is the Commission’s role in selecting the projects that will be included in the next RTP.  Option 2 would have subjected more projects to a performance assessment, thereby empowering the Commission with greater discretion to approve or reject projects.  That decision would take into account the project’s benefits and costs; the extent to which the project meets the Bay Area’s growth, mobility, equity, air quality, and health goals; and a consideration of whether the project moves us closer to or further from achieving the SB 375 target.

But it is Option 1 that has moved forward.  More projects will be spared that exacting level of discretionary review, and we may need to rely more on other strategies to meet the target.

SFpark meter in Hayes Valley, San Francisco. Image: courtesy of SFMTA.

Although programs like SFpark demonstrate progress and provide valuable case studies, opportunities abound to improve parking management in both major cities and suburbs throughout the United States.  But parking is also a touchy and controversial topic; proposals to increase parking fees are generally not greeted warmly and can be vociferously protested.

Learning from Mistakes

One barrier to implementing effective parking policy is the context in which government officials propose changes to parking fees.  Particularly during the recession, municipalities have been strapped for cash and seek to increase parking fees as a means of generating revenue to help balance the budget.  The result is that the sound policy reasons to raise the price of parking become drowned out by loud opposition from members of the public, who claim to be victims of an unfair budget that is balanced on the backs of citizens.  Cities that wait until a budget crisis knocks at their door to increase the price of parking are not doing themselves a favor because the underlying motivation for the adjustment will be transparent.  Moreover, the substance of the changes that are proposed may also reveal that underlying motivation, in that they involve simplistic blanket fee hikes — rather than a truly dynamic, market-based approach where the price of a particular parking spot changes with demand.  In short, it becomes all too clear that the purpose of the higher parking fees is not to enact sound policy, but to generate revenue.  When a city tries to do the right thing for the “wrong” reason — to the extent that increasing parking fees to avoid cutting municipal services can be deemed “wrong” — it makes it all the more difficult to try it again later for the right reason.

The marquee of the Grand Lake Theater in Oakland, which proudly displays progressive political messages, adopted a conservative stance on parking in 2009 -- an all-too-common knee-jerk reaction among many merchants. Image: courtesy of Fragmentary Evidence.

Another barrier to implementing effective parking policy is the perception that higher parking fees diminish a city’s competitiveness, as compared to nearby cities, by making it more difficult for merchants to attract customers.  This point emerged during the backlash in 2009, when the Oakland City Council considered higher fees and extended meter hours as one measure to address the city’s budget deficit.  The underlying assumption here is that the cost of parking is a significant, perhaps even the predominant, factor at play when someone is deciding where to eat dinner, see a movie, or go shopping.  And while this concern was perhaps an especially sensitive point in Oakland because of retail leakage, it overlooks several more important considerations, including: (1) that most people probably won’t travel long distances just to find cheaper parking, particularly when paying more for gas eliminates any potential savings; (2) that the increase in parking price is often minimal compared to the cost of a meal or movie; (3) that many customers seek a unique merchant, neighborhood, or experience that cannot be replicated elsewhere; and (4) that increasing the cost of parking does not necessarily make the city or neighborhood a less compelling destination, but rather, provides an incentive for customers to use transit to travel to neighborhoods they would otherwise access by car.

There are many reasons to question the assertion that higher parking fees make a city less competitive.  But whether or not this is true in fact, the mere existence of this perception suggests that rational parking reform will be an uphill battle — one in which common arguments opposing higher fees will be aired again and again, in city after city.  It is this situation that helps frame the role that regional governments can play in the conversation about parking.

A Role for Regional Participation

Involving regional entities in parking management may, at first glance, seem like a strange idea.  Traditionally, parking management has been left to cities.  Cities control how streets are used within their respective jurisdictions, and they retain the power to charge (or not) for public parking.  In California, regional entities like metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) cannot simply swoop in and force a city to change its parking policies.

And yet the above discussion suggests that a regional directive on parking could be beneficial.  An MPO can provide valuable direction by identifying best practices, assembling useful case studies, and establishing a policy framework that explains and justifies the benefits of parking demand management.  This readily available resource would provide cities with a more constructive way to frame the public discussion about parking, while educating citizens that parking reform has benefits beyond providing the city with more revenue.  Establishing a regional consensus on parking demand management could also help eliminate the popular perception that increasing the price of parking makes a city a less desirable place to do business when compared to nearby cities that retain low parking fees.  Geographically proximate cities, perhaps with the assistance of the MPO, could cooperate in developing harmonious parking policies.

MPOs can provide grants to cities that demonstrate interest in implementing smart parking demand management strategies, and in this respect, there is a useful precedent.  The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in the Bay Area has been able to take advantage of its control over funding to leverage improvements in land use — particularly in terms of planning transit-oriented development within walking distance of stations planned along new transit extensions.  Land use, like parking, is firmly within the dominion of local control.  And yet regional influence over land use is possible, despite the fact that MPOs like MTC have no statutory authority to make land use approval decisions.

A similar approach could be taken for parking reform, in which a regional policy directive both guides local planning efforts and provides the funding incentive needed to get the job done.  MTC has taken tentative initial steps to investigate what role regional governments should play in the parking arena, and in the future, I hope to discuss in more detail ways to improve regional oversight of parking.

Senate Bill 375 provides metropolitan regions in California with a compelling reason to do so now.  Parking — whether it is abundant or scarce, cheap or expensive — has tremendous influence on shaping travel choices.  Parking demand management could be an effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, both by (1) encouraging drivers to switch to transit, particularly for peak hour trips, and (2) reducing the emissions associated with drivers circling city blocks on the hunt for parking.  Rational parking policies, when combined with smart land use decisions, are a powerful tool for reducing vehicle miles traveled, and, in turn, for achieving SB 375′s regional emissions reductions targets.  One of the core lessons we take away from the Initial Vision Scenario prepared by MTC and ABAG for the Bay Area is that compact growth alone is not sufficient.  The Sustainable Communities Strategy will need to incorporate additional techniques in order to achieve the target.  A strong regional consensus on parking policy, coupled with robust implementation at the local level, could be just such a technique.

Could a different regional policy have changed the discussion over the BART Oakland Airport Connector? Image courtesy of BART.

Throughout the controversy over the Oakland Airport Connector that unfolded in 2009-2010, transit advocates opposing the project faced at least one disadvantage: The perception of nearly all local leaders with some measure of approval authority over the project — and in particular, commissioners on the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) approving the flow of funds — that the time to make substantial changes to the project had long since passed.  A project to connect BART and Oakland Airport had been studied in some form for four decades; it had been environmentally cleared for nearly one decade; and BART emphasized repeatedly that the project was ready to spring into action once the requisite federal dollars were secured and a contract was awarded.  In short, it appeared the perfect project for local officials interested in boosting their job-creation and project-delivery credentials during a recession, and after all, was that not the basic objective of the federal stimulus package?  Even as some commissioners acknowledged that the Airport Connector’s escalating cost and dwindling list of benefits made it a less convincing investment than it might have once been, the majority articulated the view that the region had long since committed itself to completing the project, and that the determined pleas of transit advocates requesting a redesigned project were eleventh hour complaints that had come too late.

The fundamental recommendation made by advocates — that transportation projects be scrutinized for cost-effectiveness, even late in the game — was simply foreign to the process.  Indeed, the identification of “committed” projects has been a consistent feature of regional decision-making, and it is generally expected that once a project is deemed to be committed, it will eventually be built once funding becomes available.  When MTC updates the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP), it examines alternative ways that the agency could invest discretionary funds while assuming that the core base of committed projects will be built.

Longtime readers of Transbay Blog may recall that in 2008, when the current version of the RTP was being developed, I argued that if MTC was serious about reducing vehicle emissions, it should assume a continuing responsibility for ensuring that regional dollars are invested wisely — by reopening the “committed” status lockbox and scrutinizing for desirability and cost-effectiveness both outdated freeway expansion projects and large transit projects that were likely to under-perform relative to their price tags.  Later that year, Jerry Brown, in his capacity at the time as Attorney General, conveyed to MTC an opinion letter adopting the same position.  Brown urged MTC to properly analyze the impacts not just of discretionary spending, but also the committed projects, and to consider shifting funds away from those committed projects that “support only one, in some cases none, of the identified performance goals.” Particularly because many of those committed projects were included in previous iterations of the RTP and were conceived of long before the passage of Assembly Bill 32, the 2009 RTP update presented an opportunity for the Bay Area to be proactive in meeting the challenge posed by climate change, even if that meant postponing or canceling projects that were once assumed to be foregone conclusions.

Defining a New Regional Policy

MTC is now finally poised to take a promising step forward by defining a new regional policy for “committed” funds and projects.  This policy would be incorporated into the upcoming RTP, which MTC will release in 2013 with the Bay Area’s first SB 375 Sustainable Communities Strategy.  The two-part policy addresses both what categories of funding the agency considers to be committed, as well as what projects would be designated as committed.

MTC’s new proposed definition for committed funds essentially doubles the amount of money over which the Commission has discretion, while correctly recognizing that certain types of funding have strings attached.  MTC cannot, for instance, shift locally generated sales tax revenue toward a project in another area.

As for projects: MTC is weighing two options for determining when a transportation project should be designated as “committed” in the next RTP. Under Option 1, a project would be considered committed if it is environmentally cleared by May 1, 2011 and is fully funded.  Under Option 2, a project would have to be further along in the development process; in addition to being fully funded, the project must have actually commenced construction (e.g. utility relocation) by May 1 to be considered committed.  A greater number of projects fall short of being “committed” under either Option 1 or 2 as compared to the current policy.  Of 70 committed projects in the current RTP, 36 would have been committed under Option 1, and just 14 of the 70 would have been committed under Option 2.  The Oakland Airport Connector, for instance, was committed under the RTP and would also have been committed under Option 1, but it would not have been committed under Option 2.

What is the significance of the “committed” designation?  Committed projects will be included in the RTP, whereas uncommitted projects could be included, but only after getting a discretionary thumbs up from the Commission.  Uncommitted projects would be subject to a performance assessment, which scrutinizes any increases in project cost and evaluates whether the project meets identified objectives.  After reviewing the assessment, the Commission would decide whether or not the project should be included in the RTP.   Neither Option 1 nor Option 2 forces the Commission to, for instance, kill all projects that are experiencing cost overruns.  The value of the new policy is that the Commission would be obliged to take a fresh look at even old projects, weigh the costs against the benefits, and then, based on up-to-date information, decide if those projects are still worthy investments.

Both Option 1 and Option 2 increase MTC’s flexibility compared to the current policy by moving the designation of “committed” status to a later stage in the project development process.  Option 2 presents greater risk for project sponsors than Option 1 — in that a substantial amount of money might be invested upfront to prepare an EIR or acquire right-of-way, only to be lost if MTC later decides not to fund the project.

Despite that drawback, I believe Option 2 to be the better choice because it captures a greater portion of the project development timeline than Option 1.  Option 2 requires that the Commission take a close look at more projects, including any noteworthy changes that may have occurred since environmental clearance.  If significant funds were expended on environmental work and ROW acquisition, the Commission would almost certainly take that into account when evaluating the project.

Policy Awaits Full Commission Vote

I am happy to report that last week, the MTC Planning Committee approved Option 2.  This vote was in part ushered in by new additions to the Commission that serve on this committee and demonstrated greater open-mindedness than some of the old guard.  The committed funds/projects policy will next be heard by the full Commission on April 27, 2011.  The Planning Committee’s recommendation is not binding, and the full Commission could still elect to revive Option 1 or craft a hybrid of the two.

But it is my hope that the Commission will approve Option 2.  MTC, for the first time, will prepare a Sustainable Communities Strategy in the 2013 RTP that aims to achieve targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles: 7 percent per capita by 2020 and 15 percent per capita by 2035.  Since the passage of Senate Bill 375, it should no longer be sufficient to explain vaguely why a particular transportation project might satisfy broad, nebulous objectives.  The Bay Area must strive to achieve a specific numeric target, and whether a project is helpful or counterproductive in this regard should carry significant weight, particularly at a time when funding is scarce.  The region will have a better chance of success if there is more flexibility to program funding for projects that reduce vehicle miles traveled, and Option 2 would help provide that additional flexibility.

In 2013, MTC will publish an update to the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP).  The 2013 RTP, consistent with previous RTPs, will outline the Bay Area’s transportation needs and priorities in relation to the funding that is expected will be made available for investment in the region through the planning horizon.  This time, however, the RTP will include and be coordinated with the SCS.  The essence of the SCS, as described in Senate Bill 375, is

a forecasted development pattern for the region, which, when integrated with the transportation network, and other transportation measures and policies, will reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles and light trucks to achieve, if there is a feasible way to do so, the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets approved by [ARB] …

The SCS will essentially serve as a blueprint that calls for focused growth in the region, preferably in established urbanized areas that are accessible by transit and are designed to encourage walking and biking.  The Initial Vision Scenario, which is a preliminary step in the process toward developing the SCS, compiles information on those urbanized areas and estimates their capacity to absorb new growth.  The Initial Vision Scenario asks the region as a whole to accommodate a population increase of 2,081,600 people (in 902,600 households) and 1,222,000 jobs by the year 2035.  These totals are based on aggressive annual growth averages that outpace historical trends (e.g. +48,800 jobs/year for the next 25 years compared to about +10,000 jobs/year for the past 20 years).

MTC’s calculations at this stage suggest that the Initial Vision Scenario achieves 11 percent per capita emissions reduction by 2020 (exceeding ARB’s 7 percent target) but only 12 percent per capita reduction by 2035 (falling short of ARB’s 15 percent target).  This represents a slight improvement over the existing RTP, but these numbers are preliminary.  The Initial Vision Scenario is not a comprehensive analysis of all relevant factors, and its suggested distribution of growth does not represent the final housing allocation that will ultimately be adopted.

The Initial Vision Scenario’s suggested distribution attempts to minimize sprawl by housing 97 percent of new households in the Bay Area’s existing urbanized areas.  Most growth is allocated to Priority Development Areas (PDAs), which include areas that local governments had previously identified (before SB 375) as preferred growth zones within their respective jurisdictions.  By incorporating into the SCS these local land use plans, which are already approved or at least have some local support, MTC and ABAG seek to develop an SCS that is a collaborative product supported by regional consensus.

PDAs and Growth Opportunity Areas identified in the Initial Vision Scenario. Courtesy of MTC/ABAG.

Local “Planning Assumptions”

During the legislative negotiation in Sacramento that led to the passage of SB 375, local government advocates lobbied to have concessions inserted into the bill ensuring that cities and counties would retain full authority to regulate land use within their respective boundaries.  More generally, the SCS may not contravene the federal requirement that regional decisions conform to recent local “planning assumptions” (for example, general plans).

Local governments in the Bay Area have already enshrined in their general plans the broad principle that it is desirable to grow through transit-oriented infill growth rather than sprawl, and many jurisdictions have taken concrete steps to implement that broad principle — by developing transit villages and specific plans that support higher densities at transit nodes, by rezoning downtown areas to accommodate more growth, and by setting urban growth boundaries.  Indeed, as noted above, the PDAs reflect the areas that local jurisdictions themselves identified as the best places to grow.  The fact that local planning activities are generally consistent with the framework that SB 375 envisioned would be advanced by regional governments suggests that the Bay Area may be well-situated to meet SB 375′s demands.

Yet even so, MTC and ABAG are walking a tightrope, and generalities notwithstanding, the devil is in the details.  One cannot help but wonder, for instance, how the Initial Vision Scenario’s statement that the area around the future Berryessa BART station in San Jose “will have grown into [a] vibrant residential communit[y]” housing 8,024 households and a mixture of neighborhood amenities will be reconciled with what has been planned for the flea market site — about 2,800 units, including low density single-family homes and a gas station approved by the city in 2009.  Although the Initial Vision Scenario is grounded in local planning efforts, MTC and ABAG allocated additional units to some PDAs that exceed local growth estimates — only “for discussion purposes” at this point, of course.  The Initial Vision Scenario also distributes growth throughout the region based on the uses and characteristics of each locality, without evaluating whether the market would support the suggested number of units in those places.

Moving forward, MTC and ABAG will need to correct the Initial Vision Scenario’s many limitations and complicate its simplifying assumptions.  Doing so will reveal the challenges the Bay Area faces in developing and implementing a realistic SCS.  The Initial Vision Scenario assumes new transit improvements, which include sixty miles of dedicated transit lanes and substantially increased capacity through higher frequency service, particularly for light rail, heavy rail, and commuter rail lines.  It does not deal with the technical and financial challenges associated with making that assumption a reality, including the existing regional funding shortfall for transit operations.  But the SCS must ultimately be consistent with the prevailing financial constraints in the RTP.  The SCS, unlike the theoretical Initial Vision Scenario, should not simply assume that transit capacity will be increased unless the RTP anticipates that the funding will be made available to provide that higher level of service.

The Initial Vision Scenario also forecasts a complete reversal of previous decades of sprawl by concentrating 97 percent of new households “within the existing urban footprint.” But as laudable as that goal is, being within the existing urban footprint is not the same as being close to reliable transit service.  Many parts of the Bay Area, although “urbanized” in the sense that they are not rural, are still not dense and remain quite auto-oriented.  It would be an error to assume that new residents of these neighborhoods will forgo driving simply because they didn’t move to an exurban greenfield development.  Thus, one task moving forward will be to determine how pedestrian and bicycle amenities can fill the gap in places where it’s not feasible to provide frequent transit — as well as to improve our ability to model how effectively these types of improvements translate into reduced emissions.  Another task will be to determine what additional measures, like pricing mechanisms, will be needed to achieve the 15 percent reduction target by 2035.

SB 375 creates a slippery balance of power between local and regional governments.  Metropolitan planning organizations are responsible for producing an SCS and may need to rely on locally unpopular measures to achieve the regional target assigned by ARB.  But at the same time, MPOs should collaborate with cities to ensure that the SCS has local support and creates actual changes on the ground.  Carefully crafted language in the Initial Vision Scenario suggests that MTC and ABAG are cognizant of this, but at this preliminary stage, the most interesting and difficult questions have not yet been addressed.

Interstate 405 in Los Angeles. Courtesy of Ian Edwards.

At its meeting yesterday, the State Air Resources Board (ARB) had a full agenda.  For one, it approved an important regulation requiring that one-third of electricity sold by utilities in California be derived from renewable sources by the year 2020.  But for the purpose of this blog, we will only discuss the Board’s other major action of the day: the adoption of final regional targets under Senate Bill 375 for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from passenger vehicles and light duty trucks.

Although ARB staff’s proposed targets were released well over one month ago, there has been, not surprisingly, some drama playing out in the eleventh hour.  Protests claiming that these proposed targets are dangerous and unachievable have appeared in California newspapers this week — from the builders, naturally, but also from Jim Spering and Bill Dodd, Bay Area county supervisors who sit on the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (the same body that supported the more ambitious Bay Area targets back in July).

At the ARB meeting, Santa Clara County supervisor Ken Yeager, who is also an MTC commissioner and ARB member, publicly disdained his fellow commissioners Spering and Dodd for misrepresenting the Bay Area’s preferred targets as “extreme” and “unrealistic” in their Mercury News opinion piece.  Compounded by the fact that builders have specifically misused preliminary Bay Area scenarios (developed to inform the target-setting discussion at ARB) in order to “prove” that more ambitious targets are infeasible and would wreak havoc during the recession, Yeager called upon Steve Heminger, MTC’s executive director, to testify specially in defense of the Bay Area’s preferred targets.  ARB ultimately adopted those same targets.

SB 375 has been a recurring topic on this blog, and newer readers interested in this topic are encouraged to peruse the archives.  Briefly: last month, staff at ARB released its proposed targets.  These were mostly the direct product of a collaborative “bottom up” process, in which ARB based its recommendations on data submitted by metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) indicating what targets would be achievable and/or ambitious in each region.

The Board has now unanimously adopted the following regional targets for the years 2020/2035, expressed as a per capita GHG reduction from 2005 levels:

There were a couple refinements of the staff proposal.  Some smaller MPOs, including Monterey Bay and Santa Barbara, stepped up to the plate and volunteered to do better than business as usual, in order to participate more fully in this statewide effort; ARB was happy to oblige.  In addition, ARB resolved to resume discussion with SCAG in February over its disputed targets (see discussion below).  But by and large, the adopted targets closely mirror the staff proposal.

The Debate Over Targets

Caught in the middle of the maelstrom of technical modeling exercises, political will, legal concerns, and persistent stakeholder advocacy is the debate over SB 375 targets.  The targets are essentially goals, not regulations, and they are certain to evolve over time.  Indeed, ARB already plans to revisit the targets in four years’ time.  Moreover, a metropolitan planning organization is not subject to sanctions if it determines that it cannot achieve its target.  Perhaps, then, it seems that the debate isn’t even worth all the fuss — particularly because even the targets that have so far been termed “ambitious” likely aren’t good enough to realize the desired overall emissions reduction.

Yet the targets are mandated, and if they do their job, they should have some effect on how planning is carried out in California.  SB 375 is written so that most of its benefits are conferred when an MPO demonstrates that it actually can achieve its assigned target — and that’s enough to convince some that the top priority should be simply to produce an achievable target, even if it’s not especially ambitious.  For others, stopping anywhere short of ambitious undermines the urgency of the need to take action on climate change.  So the debate has taken a life of its own.

Aside from the MTC scuffle described above, government officials elsewhere in California had also urged ARB to reject its staff’s proposal and instead adopt milder targets.  At its meeting on September 2, 2010, the SCAG Regional Council (on a divided vote of 29-21) rejected the ARB staff proposal, and instead supported targets of 6% reduction in 2020 and 8% reduction in 2035.  Moving forward on anything more ambitious was conditioned on a list of eleven other actions being taken — including acceleration of Measure R projects under the 30/10 initiative, and restoration of transit operating funds from the State — actions over which ARB itself has no control.  But the Regional Council’s decision should not be taken to mean that all of Southern California is uninterested in taking SB 375 seriously.  Not only have individual local governments in the SCAG region embraced the challenge posed by ambitious targets, but the Los Angeles MTA has snubbed SCAG (PDF) by indicating its support of ARB’s more ambitious recommendation.

Meanwhile, the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District determined at its meeting on September 16, 2010 that ARB’s placeholder targets (5% reduction in 2020 and 10% reduction in 2035) should be scrapped and replaced with less ambitious targets (PDF) of 2% reduction in 2020 and 5% reduction in 2035.  The MPOs in the San Joaquin Valley were quick to line up behind this milder alternative, but ARB stuck to the staff-recommended -5%/-10% target.  In spite of the substantial and unique challenges posed by the San Joaquin Valley, the Valley Air District’s alternate proposal is quite frankly a pitiful showing from California’s fastest growing region, and arguably this anti-sprawl statute’s true testing ground.

Next Steps

Moving forward, ARB will continue to exchange technical information with the MPOs, and in particular, ARB has committed to further target discussion with both SCAG and the eight San Joaquin Valley MPOs.  In preparing their upcoming regional transportation plan updates, MPOs will quantify the greenhouse gas reductions that can be realized through compact development, infrastructure expansion, pricing, and transportation demand management.  The goal for each region will be to demonstrate how implementing a combination of such measures will achieve its assigned target — if the target can indeed be achieved — by preparing a Sustainable Communities Strategy that aligns regional transportation with housing need.

Setting targets is not the end of the story, but rather, the beginning.  In adopting final targets, ARB has set in motion a new process for regional planning in California.  Although it’s easy to become entangled in emissions reductions and modeling assumptions, it’s important to remember that SB 375 is also about improving quality of life and public health, by changing the way that California thinks about and builds its cities.  Only time will tell how effective these efforts are — but the fun has just begun.

Interstate 680 through the Sunol Grade. Courtesy of John K.

When last updating the Bay Area’s Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) in Spring 2009, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission reserved a distinguished place in the RTP for its planned regional network of high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes.  The plan envisions freeway motorists paying tolls via FasTrak to beat the traffic jams, by entering specific lanes otherwise designated for high-occupancy vehicles.  Tolls would be priced dynamically throughout the day– increasing as freeways become more congested at peak travel times, and adjusting in order to maintain a relatively free-flowing traffic lane.

At full build, this network would comprise some 800 lane miles of toll lanes on most major freeways throughout the region.  About 500 of those lane miles would be built by converting existing carpool lanes to toll lanes, but the plan also calls for the construction of about 300 new lane miles.  In September 2010, the first segment of the network is expected to debut — a 14-mile southbound HOT lane on Interstate 680 through the Sunol Grade, between Route 84 in Alameda County and Route 237 in Santa Clara County.  It will be followed in Fall 2011 by the second segment — a 12-mile eastbound HOT lane on Interstate 580 in the Tri-Valley, between Hacienda Road and Greenville Road.

Optimistic assumptions paint a rosy view of the HOT network as a major new source of money for transit.  Although it would cost about $7.6 billion to finance, construct, and operate the HOT network over the next 25 years, the network was projected to generate $13.7 billion in the same time period, yielding a net revenue of $6.1 billion.  In other words, a veritable bank account overflowing with gold coins that could be used to deliver an expanded transit network. Already, before lanes are even in place, MTC has planned to use theoretical HOT revenue to close anticipated funding shortfalls, and the tolls will no doubt be regarded as a possible funding source for BART to Livermore and other projects.

There is, of course, a less rosy version.  By insisting on wider freeways, rather than simply converting existing lanes in each corridor, the HOT network as adopted would increase regional freeway capacity by building 300 new lane miles, and thereby induce an increase in driving demand commensurate with that increase in capacity.  To be fair, the Bay Area spends a comparatively small share of its regional transportation funding on roadway expansion, and in this respect is the best among its peers in California.  But given the upcoming task of preparing a Sustainable Communities Strategy to meet an ambitious target for reducing regional transportation emissions, it is fair to question how appropriate it is to leverage HOT revenue as a means of explaining away a plan that seems strategically designed to complete “unfinished” roads.

It is similarly fair to question whether the resulting revenue will cover the HOT network’s capital and operating costs, let alone become a significant source of new funding for public transit.  After all, it’s not like the whole freeway would be tolled — just the one lane.  And if the profitable segments of the HOT lane network, to the extent they exist, merely serve to subsidize other segments that operate at a loss, then at what point would transit see any of that money, and how much?  Not to mention the fact that transit would already suffer from competing with widened freeways.

MTC has not changed its position as to the underlying value of the HOT lane network, freeway widening and all.  Nonetheless, it will be going back to the drawing board because of a combination of circumstances that have emerged since adopting the RTP in Spring 2009.  One issue concerns Assembly Bill 744, introduced by Assemblymember Alberto Torrico (D-Fremont), which has been working its way through the State Legislature.  The objective of AB 744 is to authorize the Bay Area Toll Authority (BATA), which currently administers bridge toll revenue, to issue revenue bonds and to manage and oversee the HOT lane network.  The bill has been at the Senate Appropriations Committee but is collapsing under its own weight, as environmental groups sought amendments removing some segments, while traffic engineers sought more control for Caltrans over project design.

Possible smaller HOT lane network, with corridors color-coded by potential. Courtesy of MTC.

Another issue relates to what we discussed above: How much revenue can we realistically expect to go into Bay Area coffers, taking into account both lane usage and project costs?  The whole HOT lane network is, after all, premised on the assumption that motorists will be willing to pay a toll if it means a faster journey and escaping significant freeway congestion.  But commuting and congestion decrease during recessions, and the HOT revenue projections did not take into account an economic downturn.  Incorporating more realistic employment and commuting assumptions will reveal less single-occupancy vehicle demand for the HOT lanes, and thus less revenue.  Moreover, incorporating realistic cost assumptions further undercut those lower projected revenues.  Extending the construction schedule, as well as adding in right-of-way and other costs not properly accounted for (or not accounted for at all) in prior estimates adds approximately $1.4 billion to the project costs.  This is hardly a surprising development, as MTC has an ostensible penchant for under-reporting project costs.

In light of the lower projected revenue, higher projected costs, and legislative issues, it’s clear the current approach is not working.  MTC is now beginning to formulate an alternative approach to authorize at least an initial core subset of its treasured HOT lane network.  First, the plan will have to be downsized.  One possibility is pictured above — a network of 460 lane miles, priced at a cost of $3 billion.  This smaller network focuses on especially important segments of I-80, U.S. 101, I-580, I-680, and I-880.  Click here to compare it to the full network previously adopted as part of the RTP.

But without AB 744, how would even a more minimal HOT lane network be authorized?  There is an alternative path that could be pursued, by making use of Assembly Bill 798.  AB 798 authorizes the California Transportation Commission to approve applications for up to two HOT facilities in Northern California, provided that those applications are filed before the end of 2011.  And as for the revenue bonds?  The bill also creates a new governmental entity, the California Transportation Financing Authority, which can grant regional agencies like MTC the authority to issue revenue bonds for certain transportation projects, like the HOT network, that are backed by toll revenue.

MTC may ultimately choose to pursue a variant of this approach.  If so, it will need to finalize an application to submit to CTC in 2011.  There is no firm plan yet, but this is something else to keep an eye on.

The greenhouse gas targets are expressed in terms of percentage per capita reduction from 2005 levels.  Here are the draft targets:

–

¹ San Joaquin Valley counties (Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, and Tulare) were assigned a collective target.

–

The first column of numbers represents MPO projections of what might be achieved in each region by 2020, under currently prevailing regional transportation plans.  The second column is ARB’s draft target, expressed for now as a range.  The third column represents a best guess as to the reductions that are possible by 2035.  At this point in time, though, there is an insufficient technical foundation to produce serious 2035 estimates.  It’s a work in progress.

How did ARB arrive at these numbers, and what should we make of them?  Probably not too much at this point, as they are just preliminary.  But they offer, if nothing else, insight into the upcoming challenges posed by SB 375.

The chart clarifies that ARB has analytically divided California into three groups: (1) the “Big Four” urban MPOs, (2) the San Joaquin Valley, and (3) the six smaller MPOs (Butte, Monterey Bay Area, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Shasta, and Tahoe Basin).

Not much is expected of the six smaller MPOs at this point, since they have limited resources and oversee less populated regions.  For these MPOs, ARB did not propose a distinct target range as it did for the Big Four and the San Joaquin Valley.  Instead, the target will based on current greenhouse gas projections, updated to take into account the effects of the economic recession and any other reductions that may be realized.  This is basically a shortcut — and it’s not unexpected, given that these regions collectively only account for about 5% of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) statewide.  They are also expected to grow slowly.

It’s no surprise that ARB has preferred instead to concentrate its energies on the Big Four — MTC, SCAG, SACOG, and SANDAG — the regions that generate about 87% of VMT.  But beyond meeting greenhouse gas targets, SB 375 is about building better cities.  The Big Four include the majority of California’s largest cities, their established transit networks, and countless infill opportunities to house the state’s future population near transit and employment.  The Big Four have worked collaboratively in this process by modeling different future scenarios and studying how they reduce transportation emissions.  ARB’s 5 to 10% draft target for the Big Four reflects this initial analysis.  The 2035 ranges are taken directly from the MPOs as scenario outputs.  In addition to the 2035 ranges listed in the table, SCAG was the only agency to suggest an actual target for 2035 (5 to 6% reduction).  But as mentioned above, these numbers are too rough to be taken at face value.

And what are we to make of the 1 to 7% reduction target for the San Joaquin Valley?  We might as well just come out and say it.  Nobody really knows what to do about the Valley.  There are opportunities to do good land use planning there, particularly in downtown districts that will be served by high-speed rail.  For instance, Fresno — California’s fifth largest city, with about a half-million residents — was able to project some reductions, by analyzing scenarios that included bus rapid transit and increased density on mixed use corridors.  But other parts of the Valley have projected increases in emissions, which we know we don’t want.  And that is, more or less, the sentiment that is captured in the 1 to 7% reduction target.  A reduction of 1% might not be ambitious, but at least it’s not an increase.  Given the unique challenges in the Valley, more analysis is needed to pin down a suitable target.  I would only note that an anti-sprawl campaign in California cannot be deemed truly successful unless it addresses the rapid, unchecked growth of sprawl  in the Valley.

ARB’s draft targets are basically a consolidation of the collaborative work that the agency has done thus far with California’s MPOs.  But that is not the end of the story.  This summer presents a key opportunity for MPOs to refine their technical work before the fall deadline.  As they do so in the coming weeks, these draft target ranges will ideally be honed into more precise ambitious-yet-achievable targets.

One particular characteristic of the Bay Area is its expensive real estate market.  This creates an imbalance of housing and jobs at the regional scale, thereby generating interregional commutes from Central Valley cities like Tracy and Manteca, where upwards of 70% of residents commute to Bay Area jobs.  Higher relative household incomes in the Bay Area also diminish sensitivity to user fees and other changes in price — though we shouldn’t forget that in the Bay Area, as elsewhere, higher gas prices in 2008 noticeably increased transit ridership.

In order to get a sense of what an ambitious GHG target would be for the Bay Area, MTC has relied primarily on aggressive pricing and land use assumptions.  In light of the region’s comparably higher household income level, MTC modeled a pricing assumption much more ambitious than those employed by its peers in the “Big Four”: a 460% increase in the cost of automobile use.  This translates to an automobile usage cost of over $1.15 (2009 dollars) per mile driven in 2035.  That cost increase incorporates new revenue sources, particularly congestion pricing, increased parking charges, and a carbon tax.  It can be difficult to gather political support for these types of measures, particularly in the current economic downturn — but it also seems clear that we will need to turn to these revenue sources in the future.  Their inclusion in this model is therefore appropriate.

MTC also modeled land use assumptions that are much more aggressive than current projections.  These assumptions decrease the population at the fringe of the Bay Area (particularly in Solano and Contra Costa counties), and they correspondingly increase the population of the urban core — including a 22% increase in San Francisco’s population above existing, already optimistic projections.

These assumptions translate into the following per capita GHG reductions (compared to 2005):

• Implementing the Bay Area’s most recent Regional Transportation Plan yields GHG reductions of 5% by 2020 and 3% by 2035.
• Adding either land use or pricing assumptions to the RTP yields GHG reductions of 7% by 2020 and 10% by 2035.
  
• Adding both land use and pricing assumptions to the RTP yields GHG reductions of 10% by 2020 and 12% by 2035.

Other scenarios were considered as well, but the bottom line is that the 12% figure represents the current ambitious target for Bay Area GHG reduction by the year 2035.  It is questionable whether this target is achievable in light of its aggressive underlying assumptions.  Nonetheless, inputting less aggressive assumptions into more robust models could potentially yield more reduction than anticipated.  This preliminary analysis suggests that there is room for the Bay Area to achieve a more ambitious target that goes beyond business as usual.  An ambitious GHG target presents an excellent opportunity for the Bay Area to develop a Sustainable Communities Strategy that demonstrates the benefits of coupling infrastructure investments with creative land use and pricing strategies.

Is the OAC dead? While I’d love to say “yes,” in good conscience I can only say the answer here is “no” — or, at the least, “not yet.”

BART is of course convinced, or at least puts on a brave face, that the project is not dead.  The agency’s commitment remains steadfast, we are told, as though abandoning the project at this late stage would dishonorably betray the trust of the public.  (Quite the opposite.)  This reaction, while predictable, is disappointing.  Rather than take a step back to reevaluate the mistakes of the past year; rather than internalize FTA’s comments and take them to heart; rather than work with the community to cooperate on a mutually beneficial solution — BART evinced bitterness and indignation when things did not go its way.  BART, which for so many people is the face of public transportation in the Bay Area, should, perhaps more than any other transit agency, go out of its way to embody the compassionate values of this region.  That the Bay Area’s most well-known transit agency would claim it had acted in full compliance with the Civil Rights Act when it, in fact, had not — all while allegedly acting in the name of public benefit, and while spending public dollars — is, quite frankly, embarrassing for this native of the Bay Area.

No Stimulus Funding For You

BART’s reaction also does a disservice to the public by downplaying and masking the actual severity of the defeat that the Connector was dealt.  Although FTA’s recent exchange with BART specifically focused on the $70 million of ARRA stimulus funding (on account of its more immediate deadlines), a local agency that is not in full compliance with federal law is not entitled to receive any federal monies until it brings itself into compliance.  Or, stated differently, a federal agency like FTA may not fund a local agency that is known to be in violation of federal law.  Depending on the exact timeline of BART’s Title VI corrective plan, this implicates not just the $70 million ARRA, but also $104 million of other federal money needed for the OAC, including a $79 million TIFIA loan.  That means that 35% of the $492 million total project funding is implicated.

A smaller defeat, but a defeat nonetheless, came in the form of the TIGER grant funds that were announced last week.  Remember when we talked about this last summer? MTC studied some Bay Area projects, matched them to the federal criteria for the TIGER program, and produced a short list of $133 million worth of requests for the TIGER funding.  Two of the four projects were associated with BART: a $5 million payment toward the Airport Connector’s TIFIA loan, along with a separate request for expanding the Hayward Yard.  Both BART projects were denied TIGER funding (not surprising, given the timing of the Title VI complaint).  The other two Bay Area projects, however, both received TIGER funding.  Doyle Drive received $46 million, and the Green Trade Corridor (linking the Ports of Oakland, Stockton, and West Sacramento) received $30 million.

FTA Turns Next to MTC

The Title VI complaint filed against the Airport Connector may have opened a “Pandora’s Box” of more far-reaching implications.  Cheryl Hershey of FTA sent a letter addressed to MTC, dated February 3, 2010 (see pages 6-7 of this PDF).  That letter indicates that FTA has broadened its oversight of Bay Area transit funding to include not just BART, but also MTC.  After all, MTC has repeatedly proven itself more than willing to fund the Airport Connector, oblivious and/or indifferent to any Title VI deficiencies.  Why did MTC, before eagerly dishing out federal funds to a project that was ineligible to receive them, not do its due diligence on the Airport Connector? Or for that matter, any of the projects that it funds?  Inquiring minds at FTA want to know:

As you are aware, BART is a subrecipient of the MTC, and, therefore, MTC is responsible for ensuring its subrecipients comply with Title VI . . . .  Your agency is responsible for documenting a process that ensures that all MTC subrecipients are in compliance with the reporting requirements of FTA . . .

The fact that BART has not conducted the necessary service equity analysis for the OAC project or fare equity analysis raises concerns that your agency does not have procedures in place to monitor its subrecipients.

FTA goes on to request that MTC document its Title VI procedures within 30 days.  Is the comedy of errors still unfolding?

The Battle

In short, there is no doubt that the denial of this stimulus funding is an important victory.  The OAC is now not eligible for federal funding, and the poor state of the economy has diminished additional local and state funding sources on which the OAC might otherwise rely.  That means that the project is, at least, postponed.  Urban Habitat, TransForm, Genesis, and last, but certainly not least, Public Advocates, who prepared and filed the initial Title VI complaint with FTA, deserve all of our gratitude and appreciation.  These local organizations persevered throughout one year of countless government meetings, each one seemingly more frustrating than the last, but never giving up so as long as another avenue for advocacy was available.

Their commitment to social and environmental justice, in a field that sometimes escapes mainstream attention — not the luxury, but the basic right of people, no matter their race or income level, to have access to a dependable and dignified means of transportation — is inspiring.  Their months of hard work deserve credit, because a denial of this sort does not just fall magically from the sky (or in this case, Washington DC).  It happens because real people, who are committed to a cause, put in real time to research and follow up on an opportunity, even if it seems like a long shot.  That is what happened here, and it clearly paid off.  Needy, cash-strapped agencies will now have $70 million available to use for projects that will put people to work, while more tangibly improving transit for people throughout the Bay Area.  That’s a great thing.  When it comes to the battle for the stimulus funding, there is not a shred of doubt that the transit advocates handily won.

The War

But what about the war? Not just for the OAC, but also for other megaprojects that ring up a large tab while falling short on function?  It’s extremely difficult to stop projects like this, in large part because they are propped up by deep roots — mechanisms of institutional support that are never printed on the pages of a government report, nor aired in the public halls of a government meeting.  And even if one project were, by some miracle, to be stopped, several others are queued up right behind it, waiting patiently for funding as they have waited in years past.  These projects have effectively been promised to constituents for decades, so there is an expectation that they will eventually be built, even if it does take a very long time.  Changing that underlying modus operandi is difficult, because it cuts to the decisionmakers themselves and their political connections, as well as the culture of a prevailing political, business, and administrative complex.  In other words, it goes far beyond denying one source of funding for one project.

Hearing of BART’s continued commitment to the Airport Connector, and knowing the history of MTC and BART, I would not be surprised if down the road we see the OAC — that proverbial cat with nine lives — come back from the dead yet another time.  In fact, I would be more surprised if we didn’t see it return.  The OAC was thought to be laid to rest on previous occasions, only to be revived, as it was revived in 2009 by the stimulus.  There is also no doubt in my mind that MTC will thoroughly review every last transportation funding program offered at every level of government, and every last pot of money — looking for what, exactly?  In persistent search of obscure conditions and loopholes, just to find a way to shift around enough money to refill the Airport Connector’s freshly-opened capital budget hole, substantial hole though it may be.  What initially seem like neutral pots of money take on a life and significance of their own.  This is just what MTC does, and it will do so here.

Then again, a few years ago, I would not have guessed that federal stimulus dollars would become available, nor would I have guessed that the Connector would ultimately be denied that funding because of a Title VI violation.  But the ingenuity and creativity of our local organizations showed us otherwise.  Despite the history, maybe you really never know.

So, is the Oakland Airport Connector dead? While I’d love to say “yes,” in good conscience I can only say the answer here is “no” — or, at the least, “not yet.”