Courtesy of SFMTA.

As one would expect in a market price experiment — as opposed to an exclusive revenue generation measure, or “stealth tax,” as it has been dubbed by the literati that haunt the SFGate comments section — the SFMTA both increased and decreased different meter rates depending on the level of demand for those parking spots.  In fact, for this first round of adjustments, most parking meters in pilot neighborhoods will be no more expensive to use than before.  Rates will decrease at 32 percent of meters within the pilot area, stay the same at 37 percent of meters, and increase at only 31 percent of meters.

Responding to the data (available as both PDF maps and an Excel spreadsheet) creates a fine-grained result in which one block may have higher rates, while a nearby or even directly adjacent block has lower rates.  Not surprisingly, there is a need to boost the price at many times of day on popular and walkable commercial segments (e.g. Hayes Street between Franklin and Laguna, Valencia Street, Fillmore Street between Bush and Jackson, Chestnut Street west of Fillmore, and the Financial District/Jackson Square).  In contrast, prices will stay the same or decrease on weekdays for high-volume traffic arteries like Geary Blvd., Van Ness, and Lombard, as well as significant portions of the Wharf, Civic Center, and South of Market pilot areas.  Although the SFMTA could have decreased rates this month by as much as 50 cents under its adopted policy, the data collected so far suggests that in three cases (Fillmore, Mission, and Marina), the rate should not be lowered more than 25 cents at any meter throughout the time period in which the meters operate, while in other pilot areas a 50-cent decrease is sometimes warranted.

Corridors like Telegraph Avenue, which are well-served by transit and have plenty of room for urban infill, will be targeted for growth. Image: Flickr account.

SB 375 now calls for a blend of the RHNA with the Sustainable Communities Strategy (SCS):

It is the intent of the Legislature that housing planning be coordinated and integrated with the regional transportation plan. To achieve this goal, the allocation plan shall allocate housing units within the region consistent with the development pattern included in the sustainable communities strategy.

The final allocation plan shall ensure that the total regional housing need, by income category … is maintained, and that each jurisdiction in the region receive an allocation of units for low- and very low income households.

The resolution approving the final housing need allocation plan shall demonstrate that the plan is consistent with the sustainable communities strategy in the regional transportation plan.

(Government Code, §§ 65584.04(i)(1), 65584.04(i)(2), 65584.04(i)(3).)

SB 375 leaves open the question of exactly how the two ought to be blended.  But if you acknowledge that growth should be targeted in transit-oriented locations rather than simply allowed to sprout at random, then it is almost a direct corollary that an “unfair share” distribution of housing will result.  Perhaps because it is still early in the process, ABAG and MTC thus far have not emphasized the fair share distinction.  It was not surprising, then, to find some initial pushback in a report prepared by Berkeley city staff.  This piece in the Berkeley Patch, written by Livable Berkeley, summarizes the conclusions of the staff report as follows:

City staff’s “educated guess” is that the level of growth posited in the scenario exceeds what can be feasibly accommodated in Berkeley.  Staff is also concerned that other communities are not being asked to do as much as Berkeley.

Staff’s remarks were offered in response to the Initial Vision Scenario, which included a preliminary estimate of the new housing Berkeley should plan to accommodate: 15,730 additional units under ABAG’s aggressive growth projections, concentrated in the downtown and along more robust transit corridors like San Pablo, University, and Telegraph Avenues.  Interestingly, even though staff offers its “educated guess” that this level of growth cannot be feasibly accommodated, the report admits that “staff has not generally quantified the capacity of these areas to accommodate new units” and that “staff has not begun to test the feasibility of the numbers generated for the [Initial Vision Scenario].”  (PDF of staff report)

In short, Berkeley city staff has offered an “educated guess” that is ostensibly based on little education.  Which would make it … just a plain old guess?  The report proposes that the guess is based on the City’s Housing Element work, but that is an iterative process, and it does not terminate just because a city claims it has no more space after completing the last iteration.

The staff report illustrates the tension between SB 375 and fair share.  Hypothetically, if all cities were served by transit equally well, it would be reasonable to expect each city to absorb its fair share of housing need in the traditional sense.  In reality, though, transit service is not provided uniformly throughout the region, and a principal objective of the SCS is to bring transit networks and housing distributions into alignment.  This means that a city like Berkeley — which is home to the University, a major trip generator, and is served by three BART stations, the Capitol Corridor, and major bus transit corridors — is a natural place for growth.  Clayton (to pick one example), which was assigned just 124 new households, is not.

That disparity may seem “unfair” to some, but the Initial Vision Scenario arguably does not go far enough.  If one goal of the SCS is to increase the share of the Bay Area’s population living in places that resemble Berkeley, the Initial Vision Scenario does not accomplish that goal with respect to Berkeley itself — because the growth it describes in Berkeley closely mirrors the regional trend and is actually slower than Alameda County as a whole.  Indeed, in 2010, 1.728 percent of Bay Area households called Berkeley home; in 2035, if the Initial Vision Scenario’s allocation were to become reality, that share would barely increase to 1.732 percent.  In contrast, the allocations for other East Bay cities like Oakland, Emeryville, Fremont, Livermore, Dublin, and Pleasanton pick up the slack with growth that outpaces both Alameda County and the region as a whole.  Notably, the Initial Vision Scenario does not take into account unmet demand for more housing in walkable, centrally-located neighborhoods like those in Berkeley.

To the extent there is a break from fair share as it has traditionally been implemented, the concerns of the Berkeley staff report will resonate with other cities in California, and it will be interesting to see how fair share is ultimately folded into the SB 375 framework.

The actual balance sheet is worse, of course, as the $484 million figure does not include operating costs.  Despite charging $6 fares to pay off a $100 million federal loan, an additional subsidy — on the order of $9.85 per ride, compared to $1.95 for a bus rapid transit project — would be required given current passenger traffic levels at the airport.  In short, public dollars are being “invested” in a way that pointlessly maximizes future costs. The fact that $95 million has already been consumed, while certainly interesting given how little there is to show for it, is immaterial when evaluating whether that additional ongoing cost is a worthwhile one to bear.  (Comments)

If you have been reading this website for awhile, you might remember that a few years ago I used to maintain a fairly active Flickr account used in conjunction with the blog, uploading renderings and construction progress photos.  That Flickr account has been sitting dormant for the past few years, but the time has come to revive it.  My hope is to update it regularly, and while some photos will be connected to articles here, others will be posted there independently.  Click here to see the photostream, and for easy future access, a Flickr link has been added to the sidebar.

Since last summer I have dropped by the Transbay site to photograph various stages in the demolition of the old Terminal.  On the Flickr account, I have now uploaded a couple hundred Transbay-related photos, including one set of photos for the East Loop and temporary terminal, and another set of photos for the demolition of the main building.  The full Transbay Terminal collection includes photos from the final operating days of the Terminal and the groundbreaking ceremony, which were posted here last year in the form of slideshows.  There is also a set for the recently-opened West Dublin/Pleasanton BART station.  Finally, I posted urbanist-oriented photos from two recent visits to New York.

There should be more substantive content here next week, but in the meantime, I hope you enjoy these photo sets.

At what point is a project far enough along in the process to be “committed”?  We looked before at the two policy choices that were being considered.  There is more detail in that previous post, but the brief recap is that with “Option 1,” a project is committed if it has been environmentally cleared, e.g. the project has an EIR certified under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  With “Option 2,” a project is not committed until dirt has turned and construction is underway.  Of these two options, I supported Option 2 because it would expose commissioners to a benefit-cost analysis for more projects, thereby empowering them with greater discretion to decide whether even older projects are still worthy of pursuit.  The Planning Committee also supported Option 2 and voted to move it forward to the full Commission.

At its April 27 meeting, however, the Commission unfortunately retreated from the committee recommendation, voting in favor of the less rigorous Option 1.

Part of what made this vote disappointing was that some committee members who supported Option 2 a few weeks ago changed their minds and voted for Option 1.  These fickle commissioners include the now-ousted Jon Rubin (who frankly surprised me when he supported Option 2 in the first place, but ultimately opted to cast a less-than-stellar vote as his final vote on the Commission) and Sam Liccardo (a San Jose councilmember whom I suspect was concerned about placing too many obstacles in front of the full BART extension).  Had these committee members continued to support Option 2, the vote would have tilted the other way.

Other commissioners, albeit too few in number to change the vote, recognized that projects should be included based on their intrinsic merit and ability to satisfy performance targets.  These commissioners include San Francisco supervisor David Campos (who, despite being newly appointed, honed in on the issue quickly, or at least picked up on the right cues), and BCDC commissioner Anne Halsted (who was willing to engage and grasped the value of Option 2 in the climate target discussion).

Had the new committed projects policy been in place a few years ago, building the Caldecott Tunnel's fourth bore would have been subject to performance review and Commission approval under Option 2 but not Option 1. Image: courtesy of Caltrans.

Over the past few years certain high-profile projects, like Warm Springs and the Caldecott Tunnel fourth bore, have moved forward into construction phase and are deemed committed no matter what.  The practical implications of choosing one option over the other will emerge as the next project cycle takes shape.  As a matter of principle, though, the Commission’s vote demonstrates an unwillingness to take responsibility for ensuring that taxpayer dollars are invested wisely, and a reluctance to engage in true planning, as opposed to mere assembly of a to-do list.

Although this is disheartening, it is not surprising.  Even when sitting on a regional board, commissioners are still elected local officials at heart, interested in moving projects forward with a minimum of delay and controversy.  Whether a particular local project is the best and most cost-effective way to meet identified regional performance targets is a different and sometimes even conflicting question, however, and it is precisely the question that commissioners would have confronted more robustly had Option 2 moved forward.  Although Option 1 is an improvement on previous policy, even Option 1 does not go far enough.  Under Option 1, projects that have been environmentally cleared are insulated, and it is true that environmental clearance is itself a major milestone that is reached only after a project has been subjected to significant public comment.  But environmental laws like CEQA are designed primarily to disclose a project’s impacts to the physical environment.  They are not designed to effectively engage the issues that are central to deciding whether a region should commit funding to a particular transportation project.  Having that latter discussion requires an additional layer of regional oversight, which Option 2 would have provided. Moreover, as the Oakland Airport Connector demonstrates, projects can change significantly in cost and scope if they are left in limbo for years after being cleared.  Yet Option 1 shields those changes from scrutiny.

Option 2 would also have put MTC in a better position to meet the Bay Area’s obligations under Senate Bill 375.  One of the principal takeaways from the Initial Vision Scenario is that meeting the regional target of 15 percent per capita reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is more than simply a matter of concentrating growth in the right places — for despite its optimistic assumptions, even that scenario fell short of achieving the 15 percent target.  MTC will need to bring to bear more tools in order to craft an RTP and Sustainable Communities Strategy that does meet the target, and one critically important tool is the Commission’s role in selecting the projects that will be included in the next RTP.  Option 2 would have subjected more projects to a performance assessment, thereby empowering the Commission with greater discretion to approve or reject projects.  That decision would take into account the project’s benefits and costs; the extent to which the project meets the Bay Area’s growth, mobility, equity, air quality, and health goals; and a consideration of whether the project moves us closer to or further from achieving the SB 375 target.

But it is Option 1 that has moved forward.  More projects will be spared that exacting level of discretionary review, and we may need to rely more on other strategies to meet the target.

That’s one reason I was excited that SFpark launched this past week, generating a continuous open data feed that tracks the location and quantity of available parking in the handful of identified pilot neighborhoods. Consider the following maps of the Fillmore and Mission, screenshots from Friday night:

SFpark pilot areas: Fillmore (left) and Mission (right), on Friday night (April 22 at 10:15 p.m.). Red = 0-15 percent of parking available, light blue = 15-30 percent available, dark blue = more than 30 percent available.

(Links to all Friday maps: Financial District, South of Market, Civic Center/Hayes Valley, Fillmore, Mission, Wharf, Marina.)

And another set of screenshots for the Financial District and South of Market, taken at 12 noon on Sunday:

SFpark pilot area: Financial District, on Sunday (April 24 at 12 noon). Red = 0-15 percent of parking available, light blue = 15-30 percent available, dark blue = more than 30 percent available.

SFpark pilot area: South of Market, on Sunday (April 24 at 12 noon). Red = 0-15 percent of parking available, light blue = 15-30 percent available, dark blue = more than 30 percent available.

(Links to all Sunday maps: Financial District, South of Market, Civic Center/Hayes Valley, Fillmore, Mission, Wharf, Marina.)

The MTA will monitor occupancy on each block and adjust the parking meter rate periodically based on demand. To ensure that at least one parking spot is available per block for the most part, pilot blocks that are at least 85 percent occupied during certain periods of the day will be targeted for a rate increase during those time periods. In the screenshots above, stretches of block marked in red, with less than 15 percent of spots available, are those high-demand spots that would theoretically be targeted for a rate increase.

One conclusion that can be derived at a glance? That the market price for parking in the evenings and on Sundays in these pilot neighborhoods is higher than what is currently being charged (which is zilch).  When parking is free, motorists have little incentive to vacate parking spots in a timely fashion.  Another good reason to revisit extended parking meter hours?

(No, this is not a groundbreaking revelation.  Yes, there was already data supporting agency staff’s previous recommendation to extend meter hours.  Yes, that data was ignored by squirming politicians.)

SFpark meter in Hayes Valley, San Francisco. Image: courtesy of SFMTA.

Although programs like SFpark demonstrate progress and provide valuable case studies, opportunities abound to improve parking management in both major cities and suburbs throughout the United States.  But parking is also a touchy and controversial topic; proposals to increase parking fees are generally not greeted warmly and can be vociferously protested.

Learning from Mistakes

One barrier to implementing effective parking policy is the context in which government officials propose changes to parking fees.  Particularly during the recession, municipalities have been strapped for cash and seek to increase parking fees as a means of generating revenue to help balance the budget.  The result is that the sound policy reasons to raise the price of parking become drowned out by loud opposition from members of the public, who claim to be victims of an unfair budget that is balanced on the backs of citizens.  Cities that wait until a budget crisis knocks at their door to increase the price of parking are not doing themselves a favor because the underlying motivation for the adjustment will be transparent.  Moreover, the substance of the changes that are proposed may also reveal that underlying motivation, in that they involve simplistic blanket fee hikes — rather than a truly dynamic, market-based approach where the price of a particular parking spot changes with demand.  In short, it becomes all too clear that the purpose of the higher parking fees is not to enact sound policy, but to generate revenue.  When a city tries to do the right thing for the “wrong” reason — to the extent that increasing parking fees to avoid cutting municipal services can be deemed “wrong” — it makes it all the more difficult to try it again later for the right reason.

The marquee of the Grand Lake Theater in Oakland, which proudly displays progressive political messages, adopted a conservative stance on parking in 2009 -- an all-too-common knee-jerk reaction among many merchants. Image: courtesy of Fragmentary Evidence.

Another barrier to implementing effective parking policy is the perception that higher parking fees diminish a city’s competitiveness, as compared to nearby cities, by making it more difficult for merchants to attract customers.  This point emerged during the backlash in 2009, when the Oakland City Council considered higher fees and extended meter hours as one measure to address the city’s budget deficit.  The underlying assumption here is that the cost of parking is a significant, perhaps even the predominant, factor at play when someone is deciding where to eat dinner, see a movie, or go shopping.  And while this concern was perhaps an especially sensitive point in Oakland because of retail leakage, it overlooks several more important considerations, including: (1) that most people probably won’t travel long distances just to find cheaper parking, particularly when paying more for gas eliminates any potential savings; (2) that the increase in parking price is often minimal compared to the cost of a meal or movie; (3) that many customers seek a unique merchant, neighborhood, or experience that cannot be replicated elsewhere; and (4) that increasing the cost of parking does not necessarily make the city or neighborhood a less compelling destination, but rather, provides an incentive for customers to use transit to travel to neighborhoods they would otherwise access by car.

There are many reasons to question the assertion that higher parking fees make a city less competitive.  But whether or not this is true in fact, the mere existence of this perception suggests that rational parking reform will be an uphill battle — one in which common arguments opposing higher fees will be aired again and again, in city after city.  It is this situation that helps frame the role that regional governments can play in the conversation about parking.

A Role for Regional Participation

Involving regional entities in parking management may, at first glance, seem like a strange idea.  Traditionally, parking management has been left to cities.  Cities control how streets are used within their respective jurisdictions, and they retain the power to charge (or not) for public parking.  In California, regional entities like metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) cannot simply swoop in and force a city to change its parking policies.

And yet the above discussion suggests that a regional directive on parking could be beneficial.  An MPO can provide valuable direction by identifying best practices, assembling useful case studies, and establishing a policy framework that explains and justifies the benefits of parking demand management.  This readily available resource would provide cities with a more constructive way to frame the public discussion about parking, while educating citizens that parking reform has benefits beyond providing the city with more revenue.  Establishing a regional consensus on parking demand management could also help eliminate the popular perception that increasing the price of parking makes a city a less desirable place to do business when compared to nearby cities that retain low parking fees.  Geographically proximate cities, perhaps with the assistance of the MPO, could cooperate in developing harmonious parking policies.

MPOs can provide grants to cities that demonstrate interest in implementing smart parking demand management strategies, and in this respect, there is a useful precedent.  The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in the Bay Area has been able to take advantage of its control over funding to leverage improvements in land use — particularly in terms of planning transit-oriented development within walking distance of stations planned along new transit extensions.  Land use, like parking, is firmly within the dominion of local control.  And yet regional influence over land use is possible, despite the fact that MPOs like MTC have no statutory authority to make land use approval decisions.

A similar approach could be taken for parking reform, in which a regional policy directive both guides local planning efforts and provides the funding incentive needed to get the job done.  MTC has taken tentative initial steps to investigate what role regional governments should play in the parking arena, and in the future, I hope to discuss in more detail ways to improve regional oversight of parking.

Senate Bill 375 provides metropolitan regions in California with a compelling reason to do so now.  Parking — whether it is abundant or scarce, cheap or expensive — has tremendous influence on shaping travel choices.  Parking demand management could be an effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, both by (1) encouraging drivers to switch to transit, particularly for peak hour trips, and (2) reducing the emissions associated with drivers circling city blocks on the hunt for parking.  Rational parking policies, when combined with smart land use decisions, are a powerful tool for reducing vehicle miles traveled, and, in turn, for achieving SB 375′s regional emissions reductions targets.  One of the core lessons we take away from the Initial Vision Scenario prepared by MTC and ABAG for the Bay Area is that compact growth alone is not sufficient.  The Sustainable Communities Strategy will need to incorporate additional techniques in order to achieve the target.  A strong regional consensus on parking policy, coupled with robust implementation at the local level, could be just such a technique.

350 Mission Street. Courtesy of GLL Development and Mangement, Inc.

350 Mission Street is a 375-foot proposed office tower to be built at the corner of Mission and Fremont Streets in downtown San Francisco.  The site, which currently has a low-rise building occupied by Heald College, is catty-corner to the large construction site that will become the Transbay Transit Center.

Current building at 350 Mission project site.

350 Mission is a solid infill project in the growing canyon of high-rises along Mission Street.  It’s clearly a better use of space than current conditions, but as far as shaping the city skyline is concerned, it’s not a game-changer.  The tower will be dwarfed even by existing neighbors at 50 Fremont and the Millennium — not to mention a future neighbor, the Transbay tower, which will be the city’s tallest.  Given the project’s proximity to the Transit Center and its prime location, it’s hard not to be disappointed with the building height, particularly after the initial mention of an 850-foot tower.  But for an office building, the small project site (about 19,000 square feet) is a real constraint, and adding another elevator bank in a taller building would have reduced the amount of space that could be leased.

Besides, just because a tower is relatively short does not mean it is doomed to lack interesting design and sustainability features.  I will reserve judgment on the moving benches until actually seeing them, but if the constructed building looks like the renderings, it will be a worthy addition to this intersection in spite of its height. The tower’s interaction with the street at ground level is also promising, including eatery space and a lobby opening onto the corner of Mission and Fremont, accentuated by ampitheater-style seating.  The first floor of offices, located above the ground floor and mezzanine, is designed to be about 50 feet above grade, and the lobby’s spacious indoor gathering area will be a nice complement to the public space that will be built across the intersection at the Transit Center.

The owners of 50 Beale Street appealed the Planning Commission’s approval of 350 Mission on CEQA grounds, but the appeal really raised design issues that were framed in terms of CEQA catchphrases.  50 Beale is a 24-story office building located adjacent to the proposed tower and is probably quite sorry to lose its views to the west over the low-rise building that now occupies the 350 Mission site.  To create a CEQA argument, 50 Beale objected to the mechanical element at 350 Mission, which would extend to only about twelve feet from the 50 Beale building.  Even though tower separation was the real sticking point, the mechanical element served as a target on which to pin particular physical impacts like noise and air quality.  50 Beale also argued that the EIR should have analyzed a taller code-compliant alternative.  That’s right: It’s another round of “you should have picked my favorite alternative.”  But CEQA does not demand that an EIR analyze everyone’s favorite alternatives — only that it examine a reasonable range of alternatives that lessen a proposed project’s impacts.  More to the point, there is nothing especially magical about a code-compliant alternative in the abstract, unless not complying with the code exacerbates or introduces additional physical impacts that could be lessened or avoided by complying.  The non-compliant aspects of 350 Mission (bulk and setback) were not the source of the tower’s significant impacts.  The EIR actually did analyze a code-compliant alternative and determined that complying with the code would not lessen these already less-than-significant impacts.  This is not all that unexpected given the project’s nature and physical setting, and it makes this a less compelling alternative from a CEQA perspective.

The Board of Supervisors voted unanimously to certify the EIR, so the tower will move forward.

Could a different regional policy have changed the discussion over the BART Oakland Airport Connector? Image courtesy of BART.

Throughout the controversy over the Oakland Airport Connector that unfolded in 2009-2010, transit advocates opposing the project faced at least one disadvantage: The perception of nearly all local leaders with some measure of approval authority over the project — and in particular, commissioners on the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) approving the flow of funds — that the time to make substantial changes to the project had long since passed.  A project to connect BART and Oakland Airport had been studied in some form for four decades; it had been environmentally cleared for nearly one decade; and BART emphasized repeatedly that the project was ready to spring into action once the requisite federal dollars were secured and a contract was awarded.  In short, it appeared the perfect project for local officials interested in boosting their job-creation and project-delivery credentials during a recession, and after all, was that not the basic objective of the federal stimulus package?  Even as some commissioners acknowledged that the Airport Connector’s escalating cost and dwindling list of benefits made it a less convincing investment than it might have once been, the majority articulated the view that the region had long since committed itself to completing the project, and that the determined pleas of transit advocates requesting a redesigned project were eleventh hour complaints that had come too late.

The fundamental recommendation made by advocates — that transportation projects be scrutinized for cost-effectiveness, even late in the game — was simply foreign to the process.  Indeed, the identification of “committed” projects has been a consistent feature of regional decision-making, and it is generally expected that once a project is deemed to be committed, it will eventually be built once funding becomes available.  When MTC updates the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP), it examines alternative ways that the agency could invest discretionary funds while assuming that the core base of committed projects will be built.

Longtime readers of Transbay Blog may recall that in 2008, when the current version of the RTP was being developed, I argued that if MTC was serious about reducing vehicle emissions, it should assume a continuing responsibility for ensuring that regional dollars are invested wisely — by reopening the “committed” status lockbox and scrutinizing for desirability and cost-effectiveness both outdated freeway expansion projects and large transit projects that were likely to under-perform relative to their price tags.  Later that year, Jerry Brown, in his capacity at the time as Attorney General, conveyed to MTC an opinion letter adopting the same position.  Brown urged MTC to properly analyze the impacts not just of discretionary spending, but also the committed projects, and to consider shifting funds away from those committed projects that “support only one, in some cases none, of the identified performance goals.” Particularly because many of those committed projects were included in previous iterations of the RTP and were conceived of long before the passage of Assembly Bill 32, the 2009 RTP update presented an opportunity for the Bay Area to be proactive in meeting the challenge posed by climate change, even if that meant postponing or canceling projects that were once assumed to be foregone conclusions.

Defining a New Regional Policy

MTC is now finally poised to take a promising step forward by defining a new regional policy for “committed” funds and projects.  This policy would be incorporated into the upcoming RTP, which MTC will release in 2013 with the Bay Area’s first SB 375 Sustainable Communities Strategy.  The two-part policy addresses both what categories of funding the agency considers to be committed, as well as what projects would be designated as committed.

MTC’s new proposed definition for committed funds essentially doubles the amount of money over which the Commission has discretion, while correctly recognizing that certain types of funding have strings attached.  MTC cannot, for instance, shift locally generated sales tax revenue toward a project in another area.

As for projects: MTC is weighing two options for determining when a transportation project should be designated as “committed” in the next RTP. Under Option 1, a project would be considered committed if it is environmentally cleared by May 1, 2011 and is fully funded.  Under Option 2, a project would have to be further along in the development process; in addition to being fully funded, the project must have actually commenced construction (e.g. utility relocation) by May 1 to be considered committed.  A greater number of projects fall short of being “committed” under either Option 1 or 2 as compared to the current policy.  Of 70 committed projects in the current RTP, 36 would have been committed under Option 1, and just 14 of the 70 would have been committed under Option 2.  The Oakland Airport Connector, for instance, was committed under the RTP and would also have been committed under Option 1, but it would not have been committed under Option 2.

What is the significance of the “committed” designation?  Committed projects will be included in the RTP, whereas uncommitted projects could be included, but only after getting a discretionary thumbs up from the Commission.  Uncommitted projects would be subject to a performance assessment, which scrutinizes any increases in project cost and evaluates whether the project meets identified objectives.  After reviewing the assessment, the Commission would decide whether or not the project should be included in the RTP.   Neither Option 1 nor Option 2 forces the Commission to, for instance, kill all projects that are experiencing cost overruns.  The value of the new policy is that the Commission would be obliged to take a fresh look at even old projects, weigh the costs against the benefits, and then, based on up-to-date information, decide if those projects are still worthy investments.

Both Option 1 and Option 2 increase MTC’s flexibility compared to the current policy by moving the designation of “committed” status to a later stage in the project development process.  Option 2 presents greater risk for project sponsors than Option 1 — in that a substantial amount of money might be invested upfront to prepare an EIR or acquire right-of-way, only to be lost if MTC later decides not to fund the project.

Despite that drawback, I believe Option 2 to be the better choice because it captures a greater portion of the project development timeline than Option 1.  Option 2 requires that the Commission take a close look at more projects, including any noteworthy changes that may have occurred since environmental clearance.  If significant funds were expended on environmental work and ROW acquisition, the Commission would almost certainly take that into account when evaluating the project.

Policy Awaits Full Commission Vote

I am happy to report that last week, the MTC Planning Committee approved Option 2.  This vote was in part ushered in by new additions to the Commission that serve on this committee and demonstrated greater open-mindedness than some of the old guard.  The committed funds/projects policy will next be heard by the full Commission on April 27, 2011.  The Planning Committee’s recommendation is not binding, and the full Commission could still elect to revive Option 1 or craft a hybrid of the two.

But it is my hope that the Commission will approve Option 2.  MTC, for the first time, will prepare a Sustainable Communities Strategy in the 2013 RTP that aims to achieve targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles: 7 percent per capita by 2020 and 15 percent per capita by 2035.  Since the passage of Senate Bill 375, it should no longer be sufficient to explain vaguely why a particular transportation project might satisfy broad, nebulous objectives.  The Bay Area must strive to achieve a specific numeric target, and whether a project is helpful or counterproductive in this regard should carry significant weight, particularly at a time when funding is scarce.  The region will have a better chance of success if there is more flexibility to program funding for projects that reduce vehicle miles traveled, and Option 2 would help provide that additional flexibility.

In 2013, MTC will publish an update to the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP).  The 2013 RTP, consistent with previous RTPs, will outline the Bay Area’s transportation needs and priorities in relation to the funding that is expected will be made available for investment in the region through the planning horizon.  This time, however, the RTP will include and be coordinated with the SCS.  The essence of the SCS, as described in Senate Bill 375, is

a forecasted development pattern for the region, which, when integrated with the transportation network, and other transportation measures and policies, will reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles and light trucks to achieve, if there is a feasible way to do so, the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets approved by [ARB] …

The SCS will essentially serve as a blueprint that calls for focused growth in the region, preferably in established urbanized areas that are accessible by transit and are designed to encourage walking and biking.  The Initial Vision Scenario, which is a preliminary step in the process toward developing the SCS, compiles information on those urbanized areas and estimates their capacity to absorb new growth.  The Initial Vision Scenario asks the region as a whole to accommodate a population increase of 2,081,600 people (in 902,600 households) and 1,222,000 jobs by the year 2035.  These totals are based on aggressive annual growth averages that outpace historical trends (e.g. +48,800 jobs/year for the next 25 years compared to about +10,000 jobs/year for the past 20 years).

MTC’s calculations at this stage suggest that the Initial Vision Scenario achieves 11 percent per capita emissions reduction by 2020 (exceeding ARB’s 7 percent target) but only 12 percent per capita reduction by 2035 (falling short of ARB’s 15 percent target).  This represents a slight improvement over the existing RTP, but these numbers are preliminary.  The Initial Vision Scenario is not a comprehensive analysis of all relevant factors, and its suggested distribution of growth does not represent the final housing allocation that will ultimately be adopted.

The Initial Vision Scenario’s suggested distribution attempts to minimize sprawl by housing 97 percent of new households in the Bay Area’s existing urbanized areas.  Most growth is allocated to Priority Development Areas (PDAs), which include areas that local governments had previously identified (before SB 375) as preferred growth zones within their respective jurisdictions.  By incorporating into the SCS these local land use plans, which are already approved or at least have some local support, MTC and ABAG seek to develop an SCS that is a collaborative product supported by regional consensus.

PDAs and Growth Opportunity Areas identified in the Initial Vision Scenario. Courtesy of MTC/ABAG.

Local “Planning Assumptions”

During the legislative negotiation in Sacramento that led to the passage of SB 375, local government advocates lobbied to have concessions inserted into the bill ensuring that cities and counties would retain full authority to regulate land use within their respective boundaries.  More generally, the SCS may not contravene the federal requirement that regional decisions conform to recent local “planning assumptions” (for example, general plans).

Local governments in the Bay Area have already enshrined in their general plans the broad principle that it is desirable to grow through transit-oriented infill growth rather than sprawl, and many jurisdictions have taken concrete steps to implement that broad principle — by developing transit villages and specific plans that support higher densities at transit nodes, by rezoning downtown areas to accommodate more growth, and by setting urban growth boundaries.  Indeed, as noted above, the PDAs reflect the areas that local jurisdictions themselves identified as the best places to grow.  The fact that local planning activities are generally consistent with the framework that SB 375 envisioned would be advanced by regional governments suggests that the Bay Area may be well-situated to meet SB 375′s demands.

Yet even so, MTC and ABAG are walking a tightrope, and generalities notwithstanding, the devil is in the details.  One cannot help but wonder, for instance, how the Initial Vision Scenario’s statement that the area around the future Berryessa BART station in San Jose “will have grown into [a] vibrant residential communit[y]” housing 8,024 households and a mixture of neighborhood amenities will be reconciled with what has been planned for the flea market site — about 2,800 units, including low density single-family homes and a gas station approved by the city in 2009.  Although the Initial Vision Scenario is grounded in local planning efforts, MTC and ABAG allocated additional units to some PDAs that exceed local growth estimates — only “for discussion purposes” at this point, of course.  The Initial Vision Scenario also distributes growth throughout the region based on the uses and characteristics of each locality, without evaluating whether the market would support the suggested number of units in those places.

Moving forward, MTC and ABAG will need to correct the Initial Vision Scenario’s many limitations and complicate its simplifying assumptions.  Doing so will reveal the challenges the Bay Area faces in developing and implementing a realistic SCS.  The Initial Vision Scenario assumes new transit improvements, which include sixty miles of dedicated transit lanes and substantially increased capacity through higher frequency service, particularly for light rail, heavy rail, and commuter rail lines.  It does not deal with the technical and financial challenges associated with making that assumption a reality, including the existing regional funding shortfall for transit operations.  But the SCS must ultimately be consistent with the prevailing financial constraints in the RTP.  The SCS, unlike the theoretical Initial Vision Scenario, should not simply assume that transit capacity will be increased unless the RTP anticipates that the funding will be made available to provide that higher level of service.

The Initial Vision Scenario also forecasts a complete reversal of previous decades of sprawl by concentrating 97 percent of new households “within the existing urban footprint.” But as laudable as that goal is, being within the existing urban footprint is not the same as being close to reliable transit service.  Many parts of the Bay Area, although “urbanized” in the sense that they are not rural, are still not dense and remain quite auto-oriented.  It would be an error to assume that new residents of these neighborhoods will forgo driving simply because they didn’t move to an exurban greenfield development.  Thus, one task moving forward will be to determine how pedestrian and bicycle amenities can fill the gap in places where it’s not feasible to provide frequent transit — as well as to improve our ability to model how effectively these types of improvements translate into reduced emissions.  Another task will be to determine what additional measures, like pricing mechanisms, will be needed to achieve the 15 percent reduction target by 2035.

SB 375 creates a slippery balance of power between local and regional governments.  Metropolitan planning organizations are responsible for producing an SCS and may need to rely on locally unpopular measures to achieve the regional target assigned by ARB.  But at the same time, MPOs should collaborate with cities to ensure that the SCS has local support and creates actual changes on the ground.  Carefully crafted language in the Initial Vision Scenario suggests that MTC and ABAG are cognizant of this, but at this preliminary stage, the most interesting and difficult questions have not yet been addressed.